Information operations (IO) organizational design and procedures by Caldwell, Russell J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-03
Information operations (IO) organizational design
and procedures
Caldwell, Russell J.












Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited  
INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) ORGANIZATIONAL 








 Thesis Advisor:           Raymond Buettner 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Information Operations (IO) 
organizational design and procedures.   
6. AUTHOR(S) Russell Caldwell 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Multi National Force (MNF) operations recognize the existence of shared 
national interests in a specific geographic region. Furthermore, MNF operations 
seek to standardize some basic concepts and processes that will promote habits 
of cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide for baseline Coalition/Combined 
Task Force (CCTF) operational concepts. This thesis and its’ recommendation for 
a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are aimed at improving interoperability 
and CCTF operational readiness. The SOP will focus on the spectrum of 
Information Operations (IO) with regards to Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) during MNF operations. First, 
existing doctrine and cases will be analyzed to develop a foundation for this 
study. This thesis will seek to identify the existing IO procedures to be 
utilized during MNF operations. Next, exercise observations and lessons learned 
reviews serve as the basis for IO SOP Annex development to support the MNF SOP.
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
179 
14. SUBJECT TERMS:  Multi National Force Information Operations, 
Military Operations Other Than War, Multi National Planning and 
Augmentation Team, Information Operations 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited  
 




Russell J. Caldwell 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of Kansas, 1998 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Author:   
Russell J. Caldwell 
 
 





    
 



































Multi National Force (MNF) operations recognize the 
existence of shared national interests in a specific 
geographic region. Furthermore, MNF operations seek to 
standardize some basic concepts and processes that will 
promote habits of cooperation, increased dialogue, and 
provide for baseline Coalition/Combined Task Force (CCTF) 
operational concepts. This thesis and its’ recommendation 
for a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are aimed at 
improving interoperability and CCTF operational readiness. 
The SOP will focus on the spectrum of Information Operations 
(IO) with regards to Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) during MNF 
operations.  
First, existing doctrine and cases will be analyzed to 
develop a foundation for this study. This thesis will seek 
to identify the existing IO procedures to be utilized 
during MNF operations. Next, exercise observations and 
lessons learned reviews serve as the basis for IO SOP Annex 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  AREA OF RESEARCH 
The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) continues to refine 
its Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to support 
Information Operations (IO) in a Multi National Force (MNF) 
structure. MNF operations recognize the existence of shared 
national interests in the region and seek to standardize 
some basic concepts and processes that will promote habits 
of cooperation, increase dialogue, and provide for baseline 
Coalition/Combined Task Force (CCTF) operational concepts. 
This thesis is aimed at improving CCTF IO 
interoperability and operational readiness within the 
spectrum of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and 
Small Scale Contingencies (SCC).  A complete and usable IO 
Annex for and MNF SOP does not exist and this research will 
produce a draft IO Annex that can be incorporated into 
future MNF operations to improve CCTF IO operations. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the complex operating environment of Mutli-
National Operations, what are the appropriate standardized 
procedures for conducting MNF IO? What are the required 
contents of the IO Annex that will be required to enable 
successful IO MNF operations during MOOTW/SCC? 
C.  DISCUSSION 
Information Operations, regardless of the operational 
context, seek to influence the decision making cycle of an 
individual, a group, or a nation.  From full-scale 
conflicts to humanitarian efforts, U.S. military planners 
and operators have become aware that IO must be integrated 
and executed during the entire spectrum of conflict. During 
2 
military operations, IO must become an integral part of any 
operation. IO are essential to achieving full spectrum 
dominance. Since potential multinational partners will have 
varying levels of technology, a tailored approach to 
interoperability that accommodates a wide range or needs 
and capabilities is necessary.1  Thus, when a cadre of 
military planners comes together to plan and execute IO 
operations during MNF operations, there is a need for 
standardized IO procedures to be cultural, psychological, 
economic, technological, informational, and political 
factors as well as transnational dangers that impact 
multinational operations.2 
In order for IO to be effective during MOOTW/SCC 
operations a common foundation of understanding of IO must 
be provided. First of all, “Information warfare is about 
operations that target or exploit information resources”.3 
For Pacific Command Multinational Planning and Augmentation 
Team (MPAT) and associated actors, the expanse of the 
information warfare battle space is critical. The battle 
space extends beyond the information realm; it also deals 
with the physical and information infrastructure, as well 
as the perceptual realm. The interactions of the three 
realms dealing with information content and process form 
the basic functional model of warfare.4 The physical realms 
are the physical items that may be attack as a means to 
influence information. The information infrastructure realm 
deals with the information content or process that may be 
attacked electronically to directly influence the                      1 CJCS, JV 2020, 2000, pp. 23. 
2 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000, pp. I-2. 
3 Denning, 1999, pp. 21. 
4 Waltz, 1998, pp. 27.  
3 
information process or content without physical impact on 
the target. The perceptual realms are attacks that may be 
directly targeted on the human mind through electronic, 
printed, or oral transmission paths.5 Each realm associates 
a target with a means and a method of delivery to the 
target. From this model we can deduce that the source of 
transmission (the attacker), the transmission medium (the 
effects), and the receiver (the target) are the basic 
building blocks of the operational model of information 
operations and the foundation for effective IO.6  
D.  SCOPE OF THESIS 
We will first discuss current U.S. IO policies, their 
limitations and benefits with regards to MNF operations. 
Next, the thesis will seek to identify the correct MNF IO 
procedures by reviewing existing doctrine, lessons learned, 
and case studies to develop the foundation for the MNF IO 
SOP Annex. Finally, we will offer a new MNF IO SOP Annex. 
E.  ROADMAP OF THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the unique 
aspects of conducting Multi National Information Operations 
and the need for a usable IO SOP Annex to augment current 
U.S. IO policies and procedures.  
Chapter II introduces the reader to U.S. IO policies, 
the competing policies, current interpretations, 
limitations, and causes of friction within the DoD with 
regards to Information Operations. This chapter will serve 
as the basis for introducing new IO procedures that will 
serve MNF operations in the future. 
                     5 Waltz, 1998, pp. 27. 
6 Waltz, 1998, pp. 149. 
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Chapter III provides the basic roadmap for the 
creation of the MNF IO SOP. Furthermore, it provides in-
depth review of the limitations when conducting such 
operations, the key concepts required for understanding, 
the definitions, and elements of IO.  
Chapter IV discusses the 1991 genocide in Rwanda from 
an information perspective and relates the shortcomings of 
current U.S. Joint IO procedures for the MNF environment in 
order to focus the reader on the need for correct IO 
procedures. Chapter V examines the interaction of the case 
study on Rwanda and how the IO Annex would be useful in 
future similar situations where mutli-national forces and 
IGO, NGO, and United Nations may be involved.   
Chapter VI introduces the key concepts of the IO Annex 
in terms of Multi National Operations. The supporting IO 
reviews in Chapter II, the key ideas in Chapter III, and 
the case reviews will serve to support and structure the 
proposed IO Annex. 
Chapter VII summarizes the study, the limitations of 
the thesis, and proposed follow-on research. Appendices 
include the IO Annex followed by a simple form to create IO 
offensive and defensive tasks. The final set of annexes 
will offer a series of questions to help planners and 
operators execute successful IO operations.  
F.  BENEFITS OF STUDY  
The benefit of this study will help to identify, 
structure, and implement a viable Information Operations 
Cell Annex to support the SOP. IO is a constant evolving 
field of study. A solid baseline Annex will providing the 
basic framework and understanding of the unique challenges 
associated with operating in a MNF environment. MNF 
5 
planners will be able to continue the evolution of MNF IO 
Annex presented in this study.  It will give operators and 
planners the ability to quickly and effectively review and 
implement IO during Crisis Action Planning (CAP) or 
deliberate planning to support MOOTW/SCC.  Second, the 
study will identify the problems, drawbacks, and conflicts 
that may arise when cadres of military planners from 
various nations rapidly augment a MNF headquarters to 
support IO during MOOTW and SSC. If these factors are 
isolated prior to operations, they may be avoided during 




























II. CURRENT IO POLICIES 
Take your spears, clubs, guns, swords, stones, 
everything. Sharpen them, hack them, those 
enemies, those cockroaches. Hunt out the Tutsi. 
Who will fill up the empty graves? There is no 
way the rebels should find alive any of the 
people they claim as their own… 
  -Radio Television Libre des Milles Colines7 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Information warfare, (i.e., Information Operations) as 
a separate technique of waging war, does not exist.8 Even in 
the U.S. military there is some disagreement and confusion 
regarding the scope of I.O. For instance, the U.S. Air 
Force maintains that Information Operations are a subset of 
information warfare, and deals exclusively with the use of 
military information functions. Information operations do 
not include actions to deny, corrupt, or destroy the 
enemy's information or efforts to protect ourselves against 
those actions.9 On the other hand, the CJCS maintains that 
IO does deny, corrupt, or destroy enemy information.10 
Though definitional differences are apparent in the 
literature, for this work IO definitions will focus on the 
need to influence a leader, group, or information structure 
while protecting one’s own decision making processes. 
However, for the MPAT organization working through PACOM, a 
new definition for the SOP was created to standardize 
operations. Thus, the need to introduce and summarize the 
                     7 Adams, 1998, pp. 272. Note: Adopted from Free Radio-Television of the 
Thousand Hills or Radio Hate of the Hutu tribe that killed thousands of 
Tutsi people in 1994.  
8 Libicki, 1996, pp. x.  
9 DOAF, 1995, pp. 3. 
10 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. viii. 
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current MPAT definition and how it was created is key to 
understanding the implication of the IO Annex. 
B.  JOINT U.S. IO POLICY REVIEW 
The current and most widely accepted IO definition is, 
“IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information 
and information systems while defending one’s own 
information and information systems. IO applies across all 
phases of an operation, throughout the range of military 
operations, and at every level of war”.11 All phases of an 
IO operation apply to peace through war and eventually 
restoration procedures.  
Originally the MPAT definition was adopted directly 
from the current U.S. definition. Almost immediately, MPAT 
members found that the definition was too broad in scope 
because it failed to define what constitutes an information 
system. MPAT planners required a more precise definition in 
order to have the ability for planners from multiple 
countries find a common understanding of the scope of IO.  
For example, the goal of MPAT is, “to enhance regional 
cooperation and multinational force readiness for crisis 
response”.12  This statement indicates the MPAT will be 
called in after the earthquake, or after hostilities have 
begun, or during the need for large scale humanitarian 
operations are required. Thus the spectrum of operations 
regarding the current U.S. definition comes into question. 
If the SOP is to be used by numerous countries that have 
limited interaction and experience with IO operation, the 
ability for MPAT planners to quickly and efficiently 
reference the IO Annex is crucial when limited by time, 
                     11 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. vii. 
12 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. IV.  
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space, and force during operations. Thus the definition of 
IO requires small but important changes.  
C.  MPAT IO DEFINITION 
The current MPAT IO definition created via the inputs 
of senior officers from nations with Asian Pacific 
interests is, “Information Operations (IO) are actions 
taken to effect information, information systems, and 
influence decision making processes of political, military, 
and social entities while protecting one’s own. IO spans 
the entire spectrum from peace, to crisis, to conflict, to 
restoration”.13 MPAT participants created the definition to 
increase the understanding of the factors and the entities 
involved with IO. They felt the need to draw out the key 
phrase of “decision making processes of political, 
military, and social entities” because this would focus the 
IO cell on the process of information within the decision 
making cycle.   
The Joint US definition was changed based on two 
problems encountered during MPAT conferences. First, the 
current Joint US definition assumes the planners understand 
that information systems target information or information 
systems in order to affect the information-based process 
weather human or automated, including the decision makers 
of the opposing force.14 However, relying on interactions 
with senior officers of MPAT nations it became apparent 
that their interpretation of the US policy on IO created 
the feeling that IO only focuses on the technological 
aspects of military information operations. In order for 
MPAT planners to execute IO, the need to draw out the idea 
                     13 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. V. 
14 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. 30.  
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that IO can influence, destroy, degrade, or mislead the 
leadership and not only the technology associated with the 
opposition was crucial for the creation of the IO SOP. 
 Second, the term “adversary” was removed from the 
MPAT definition because MPAT planners felt that it implied 
that IO would always target the enemy or the aggressor 
during operations. For instance, US Joint publications 
state that although strategic offensive IO targeting may 
involve direct, indirect, and supporting attacks, most 
strategic targeting will involve direct attacks on the 
information and information systems within the elements of 
national power that will cause an adversary or potential 
adversary to make decisions favorable to US interests.15 The 
goal of MPAT is not to be involved in major conflicts where 
there is a clear separation of “good guys and bad guys” and 
major military operations are ongoing or unavoidable. Their 
focus is MOOTW.  
The MPAT organization understands and assumes that IO 
may be used against the entire population during MOOTW/SCC 
operations. For example, during such operations a “host 
nation” is designated. The host nation is a nation in which 
CCTF forces are present because of government invitation or 
international agreement to conduct CCTF operations or stage 
CCTF forces to provide support to another country.16 The 
MPAT organization understands and assumes that IO may be 
used against the entire population of the host nation 
during MOOTW/SCC operations. This implies that IO might 
possibly be used against their own population and the 
feeling of the term “adversary” may have unforeseen and 
                     15 CJCS, 1998, JP 3-13, pp. II-14. 
16 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. B3 A-1. 
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negative implications against the entity they wish to 
influence. Furthermore, the need for the definition to take 
on a less aggressive tone was required. The MPAT definition 
attempts to imply a more peaceful type of influence 
operation to meet mission objectives with-in the cultural 
and legal limitations of the operation. 
For the creation of the definition and eventually the 
IO Annex, a basic IO model was used. Waltz describes IO as, 
“Information Operations that are performed in the context 
of a strategy that has a desired objective (or end state) 
that may be achieved by influencing a target (the object of 
influence)”.17 His model of IO focuses on three levels. The 
first level of the model is the perceptual or psychological 
level and is aimed at management of the perception of a 
target audience. The second layer is the information 
infrastructure layer that accepts, processes, manages, and 
stores the information. The final layer is the physical 
system level, which includes the computers, physical 
networks, telecommunications and supporting structure 
components that implement the information system. All three 
of the layers can be attacked or defended with one or more 
elements of information operations. Table 1 summarizes 
Waltz’s characteristics of the Operational Model of 
Information Operations and serves as the backbone for the 





                     17 Waltz, 1998, pp. 148.  
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D.  KEY CONCEPTS 
IO spans the entire spectrum of military operations 
from peace to restoration. However, for the creation of the 
IO SOP, the MPAT organization focused on MOOTW/SCC 
operations. The limited scope in the nature of operations 
is due to MPAT Operational Start Points.  The Operational 
Start Points outlined in the SOP are the foundation for a 
MNF per forming rapid activation of  CCTF HQs to provide 
effective mission accomplishment. Thus, nations can use the 
SOP in a variety of ways: (1) This SOP can act as an 
additional reference to existing national SOPs; (2) It can 
be integrated into existing SOPs; or, (3) This SOP can be 
used as the national CCTF SOP.  This SOP is not intended to 
be a directive; rather, it acts as a guide upon which to 
base dialogue and planning. It is not designed to support a 
Major Regional Conflict.19   
The MNF focus is to promote stability and peace and/or 
support non-military options during MOOTW/SCC. However, 
this is not to imply that the CCTF does not maintain the 
right to self-defense or may not have to resort to military 
action, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or even to fight 
and win in a small-scale conflict. Also, the possibility 
does exist that the MPAT may be drawn into a full-scale 
regional conflict or war. IO planners must be ready for 
this possibility. The IO Annex is based on those principles 
of MOOTW/SCC operations found in Figure 1. 
                     19 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp B-1. 
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Figure 1. MNF SOP FOCUS20 
 
Figure 1 suggests clear distinctions between War and 
MOOTW, and further divides MOOTW operations by the terms 
“Not involving use or threat of force” versus “Use or 
threat of force”.  In reality, such distinctions may be 
unclear and can shift rapidly.  In the end, a military’s 
basic function is to have the ability to use force to 
impose its will on an adversary.  As such, MNF forces 
working within the ranges of MOOTW must be able to rapidly 
shift to the use of force or threat of force to ensure 
mission accomplishment. For example, Peace Keeping 
Operations (PKO) can transit quickly to Peace Enforcement 
Operations (PEO) because threat forces escalate their level 
of operations against the coalition.  The MNF must be ready 
                     20 MPAT SOP, 2002. 
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to fight (or transition to combat) at all times.  All MNF 
planning and execution actions must assure this.21 
1. Elements of Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) related to MPAT Operations  
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are 
operations that encompass the use of military capabilities 
across the range of military operations short of war. These 
military actions can be applied to complement any 
combination of the other instruments of national power and 
can occur before, during, and after war. MOOTW supports the 
deterrence of war, resolution of conflict, promotion of 
peace, and civil authorities in response to domestic 
crises, to include relief of human suffering and recovery 
from national disasters. MOOTW falls into three 
environments; permissive, hostile, and uncertain.22  IO 
planners must have a basic understanding of the three MPAT 
environments of MOOTW and understand how to tailor IO using 
the SOP in order to conduct effective IO. 
The permissive environment includes those in which the 
host country military and law enforcement agencies have 
control and the intent and capability to assist the CCTF 
operations and maintain civil order. This environment will 
include IO actions against or in support of:  
(1) Peacekeeping Operations  
(2) Antiterrorism (part of Combating Terrorism) 
(3) Freedom of Navigation (air and maritime) 
(4) Counter drug Support 
(5) Humanitarian Assistance (HA)  
(6) Disaster Relief (DR)  
(7) Protection of Shipping 
(8) Nation Assistance Programs 
(9) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) 
(10) Arms Control 
                     21 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. A1-B1. 
22 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. B7-1. 
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(11) Recovery Operations 
 
For instance, in 2001 massive earthquakes and aftershocks 
rumbled through western India that killed thousands of 
people and flattened towns and villages throughout Gujarat 
state. Immediately the United Nations, U.S. Pacific 
Command, American Red Cross, and numerous private 
organizations sent personnel and disaster relief items to 
help India deal with massive destruction and immediate 
relief. For example, the USS Cowpens (CG 63) delivered more 
than $50,000 of earthquake relief supplies to India. These 
efforts are part of the U.S. Pacific Command's mission of 
promoting peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region 
through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.23 The 
IO operation was simply to state the good intentions of the 
agencies involved and indicate to local citizens that the 
international community was there to help. These types of 
actions clearly fall into the permissive environment, the 
host nation requested and received immediate help, and the 
Indian government was in control of the situation and was 
able to support international humanitarian relief 
operations.     
MOOTW operations in a hostile environment are those in 
which hostile forces have control and the intent and 
capability to effectively oppose or react to CCTF 
operations.  The CCTF operational goal is to deter war and 
resolve the conflict.  Examples of such operations are:  
(1) Peace Enforcement (PEO) (part of Peace Operations) 
(2) Counterterrorism (part of Combating Terrorism) 
(3) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (hostile) 
(4) Enforcement of Sanctions / Maritime Intercept 
Operations 
                     23 PACOM, 2001.  
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(5) Enforcing Exclusion Zones 
(6) Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Over flight 
(7) Show of Force Operations 
(8) Raids and Strikes 
(9) Recovery Operations (hostile) 
 
The third environment is the uncertain environment. 
MOOTW in the uncertain environment is one in which the 
control, intent, and capability of host nation and hostile 
forces are unknown or uncertain. The type of IO required 
may also be uncertain. The CCTF must be prepared to operate 
in either a permissive, hostile, or uncertain environment.24 
The distinction between the hostile or uncertain 
environment may not clear. For instance, Multinational 
humanitarian and military efforts such as those seen in 
Somalia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are known as Complex 
Humanitarian Emergencies. These types of emergencies are 
complex and difficult to operate in because they contain 
political, military and humanitarian considerations.25 
Furthermore, it is not always clear how the host nations, 
factions, or the entities that control a given state or 
situation may react to multinational forces present in the 
AOR.  
In Somalia, for example, four distinct elements led to 
the conflict between UN/US forces and the Somalis in an 
uncertain environment.  These key elements were (1) the 
Somali culture and character, (2) the impact of the legacy 
left by the dictator Siad Barre on the psyche and ambitions 
of the Somali clans, (3) the tainted relationship between 
the UN leadership and the Somali people, and (4) the 
                     24 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. B7-4. 




failure of the US and UN leaders to effectively deal with 
the most powerful and influential Somali warlord, General 
Mahammad Farah Aideed.26 Prior to and during operations, the 
inability of coalition forces to differentiate between who 
controls what, when, and where led international forces to 
assure a hostile environment upon arrival. The hostile 
environment developed into an uncertain environment. The 
uncertain environment proved to be extremely dangerous for 
all sides and led to UN/US mission failure as coalition 
forces became embroiled in factional disputes.  
During MOOTW in any pre-defined environment will focus 
on the issue of CCTF legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a 
perception by a specific audience of the legality, 
morality, and/or rightness of a set of actions.  Operations 
may be strictly legal but may not be accepted as 
legitimate.  The audience can be the participating nations' 
people, host nation personnel, affected nation personnel, 
coalition forces, National Government Organizations 
International Organizations, or other factions involved in 
the crisis.  If operations are perceived as legitimate, 
then CCTF IO is likely to have strong support.  If not 
perceived as legitimate, actions may not be supported are 
more likely to be actively resisted by friendly and enemy 
elements and factions.27 
2. Elements Of Information Environment/Management 
Related To MPAT Operations 
The Information Environment (IE) is the aggregate of 
individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, 
process, or disseminate information; also included is the 
information itself. Information Management (IM) is all 
                     26 Norquist, 2002. 
27 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. B7-5. 
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activities involved in the collection, filtering, fusing, 
processing, dissemination and use of information for CCTF 
operations. Information that promotes understanding of the 
battle space enables commanders to better formulate and 
analyze courses of action, make decisions, execute those 
decisions with adjustments to the plan as necessary, and 
accurately assess the operation.28   
A disciplined, streamlined Information Management (IM) 
system allows decisions to be executed (and feedback to 
flow) more efficiently and effectively.  The focus of the 
IO staff must be on what the CCTF needs, when they need it, 
and presenting it in a usable format to support their 
planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycle. 
Integration of MNF participating nations within mature CCTF 
IM systems can present many challenges. Integration may be 
easy for some multinational participants and it may be a 
challenge for others. Unity of effort, clear and concise 
communications and information exchange must be the 
operative principles for multinational operations. The five 
crucial dimensions for measuring the quality of information 
available within the CCTF are: 
(1) Completeness: Are all the relevant items available, 
including entities, their attributes, and 
relationships between them. 
 
(2) Correctness: Are all the items in the system 
faithful representations of the realities they 
describe. 
 
(3) Currency: Age of the items of information, often 
termed their latency. 
 
(4) Accuracy or Level of Precision: Which is conditional 
on the purpose the user has in mind. 
                      28 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. C8-2. 
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(5) Consistency: Across different command centers, 
functionally specialized areas, and applications.29 
To enhance the IM system and the military utility of 
the information, the CCTF must acquire the right data, 
optimize the extraction of knowledge, distribute and apply 
the knowledge, and ensure the protection of the 
information.  The objective of each of these actions is to 
refine the information processes to optimize the 
exploitation of available data and distribution of 
knowledge to appropriate users.30 The degree of IM system 
maturity within the CCTF will be dependent upon the 
national capabilities and training levels of the 
participating nations’ forces.  Some nations’ forces will 
be fully capable and trained in modern day information 
technologies, while other nations’ may be less capable and 
not trained. Regardless of any differences in capabilities, 
an IM system must be developed that supports the CCTF's 
needs and the needs of component commanders. The four 
categories of the IM for MPAT to support IO must include: 
(1) Acquire the Right Data: The type, quality, accuracy, 
timeliness, and rate of data collected have a 
significant impact on knowledge delivered.  
 
(2) Optimize the Extraction of Knowledge: The process of 
transforming data into knowledge may be enhanced or 
refined to improve efficiency, throughput, end-to-
end speed, or knowledge yield. 
 
(3) Distribute and Apply the Knowledge: The products of 
information process must be delivered to users on 
time, in understandable formats, and in sufficient 
quantity to provide useful comprehension to permit 
actions to be taken. 
 
                     29 Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, & Signori, 1995, pp.84.  
30 Waltz, 1998, pp. 73. 
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(4) Ensure the Protection of Information: In the 
competitive and conflict environments, information 
and the collection, processing, and distribution 
channels must be protected from all forms of attack 
to secure reliability for and availability to the 
user.31 
CCTF IM will be focused on providing quality 
information to support CCTF decision-making. The goal of IM 
is to provide a timely flow of relevant quality 
information, enabling the CCTF and staff to anticipate and 
understand the consequences of changing conditions. IM 
directs the processes through which information is 
collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated. Users 
establish the information requirements. IM is performed at 
all levels, regardless of the extent of automation. The 
principles of IM apply in every situation in which a 
decision is made.32  
E. KEYS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS RELATED TO MPAT 
OPERATIONS 
Units or cells of information warriors will conduct 
the information operations that require coordination of 
technical disciplines to achieve operational objectives. 
These cells require the support of planning and control 
tools to integrate and synchronize both the defensive and 
offensive disciplines.33 Each cell that is created when the 
rapid activation of a CCTF HQs is required, must understand 
the basic elements of IO in order to be successful. 
Furthermore, Commanders of the CCTF HQ also require a basic 
framework for managing and monitoring the IO practices of 
the CCTF IO Cell. The paragraphs that follow give an 
introductory view of the elements of IO and how each one 
                     31 Waltz, 1998, pp. 73.  
32 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. C8-2.  
33 Waltz, 1998, pp. 229. 
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relates to the MPAT SOP to support successful completion of 
operations within the CCTF. 
1. Offensive Information Operations 
Offensive Information Operations are malevolent acts 
conducted to meet strategic, operational, or tactical 
objectives. The operations may be performed covertly, 
without notice to the target, or they may be intrusive, 
disruptive, and even destructive. The effects on 
information may bring physical results that are lethal to 
humans.34 Offensive IO involves the integration and 
orchestration of varied capabilities and activities into a 
coherent, seamless plan to achieve specific objectives.35  
To achieve effective offensive IO, a source of action 
must be assigned. For MPAT planners, supporting 
capabilities and activities that can be integrated to 
conduct offensive IO include the same capabilities and 
processes that traditionally support C2W, OPSEC, PSYOP, 
military deception, EW, and physical attack/destruction. 
Additionally, Computer Network Operations (CNO) may be 
considered for development and integration in offensive 
IO.36 
Offensive information operations can be a single 
attack or a larger operation or campaign that involves 
multiple attacks.37 It is useful to categorize and compare 
different types of operations. For the IO SOP, a summary of 
offensive IO in Table 2 is included to help MPAT planners 
                     34 Waltz, 1998, pp. 251. 
35 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. II-1. 
36 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. II-3. 
37 Denning, 1999, pp. 30. 
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understand exactly what are the tools and potential 
benefits or outcomes of offensive IO.  
Outcome Category/Operation  Note: 
Increased Availability 
to Offensive Player 
Collection of Secret 
Information 
Espionage and Intelligence 
Operations, OSINT, HUMINT, 
SIGINT, IMINT, Competitive 
Intel, Economic Intel 
 Information Piracy Copyright or trademark 
violations 
 Penetration into Physical 
Premises and CS 
CNO, Spies 
 Superimposition Fraud Unauthorized access to an 
information resource 
 Identity Theft Fraudulent use 
 Physical Theft Such as printed documents 
Decreased Availability 
to Defensive Player  
Physical Theft Such as printed document, disks 
 Sabotage Physical, electronic, and 
software attacks, jamming, 
physical destruction, DNS  
 Censorship Denies access to information 
sources  
Decreased Integrity Tampering Alter the contents of 
Information resources 
 Penetration Cover intrusions into the 
information space 
 Fabrication Create false information 
Table 2.   OFFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE OPERATIONS38 
                      
 
38 Denning, 2002, pp. 33. Author’s Note: Selection and employment of 
specific offensive capabilities against an adversary must be 
appropriate to the situation and consistent with CCTF objectives.  
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The targets of offensive IO fall into three distinct 
categories: the global information infrastructure (GII), 
national information infrastructure (NII), and the defense 
information structure (DII). The GII includes the 
international complex of broadcast communications, 
telecommunications, and computers that provide global 
communications, commerce, media, navigation, and network 
services between the NIIs. The NII includes the subset of 
the GII within a nation, and the internal 
telecommunications, computers, intranets, and other 
information services not connected to the GII. The DII 
includes the infrastructure owned and maintained by 
military organizations for purpose of national security.39 
For additional clarification, the MPAT planners felt within 
the three categories additional information was required 
when deciding on targeting fo offensive IO:  
 
(1) Leadership: including civilian, social, military, 
and cultural targets. 
 
(2) Military Infrastructure: including communications, 
intelligence, logistics, operations, and weapons 
systems. 
 
(3) Civil Infrastructure:  including telecommunications, 
transportation, energy, economic, and 
manufacturing.40  
 
Offensive IO gives the CCTF Commanders the ability to 
attack and influence the information environment during all 
phases of the operation. However, over a wide range of 
                     39 Waltz, 1998, pp. 173. 
40 Author’s Note: These actions must be permissible under the law of 
armed conflict, consistent with applicable domestic and international 
law, and in accordance with applicable rules of engagement. 
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offensive IO capabilities, means of delivery, and targets 
available to CCTF IO Cells, they will encounter 
limitations. Limitations associated with time, space, 
force, risk, and legal implications all impact operations. 
These limitations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
III.   
Offensive IO can utilize physical destruction. 
Currently, in the U.S. military there is a turf war 
regarding the operations domain for the physical 
destruction of targets. Thus, current policies have taken 
the physical destruction domain of operations out of IO and 
returned responsibility to the traditional war fighter, not 
the information warrior. However, IO planners must 
understand that the physical destruction of a target can 
accomplish or hinder the IO plan on the strategic, 
operational, or tactical level. The IO Annex indicates that 
an IO Cell representative must be present at targeting 
boards that deal with physical destruction of a target to 
ensure IO targets are not compromised.   
When dealing with offensive IO, the CCTF should focus 
on the precision engagement. Precision engagement is the 
ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, track 
objectives or targets, select, organize, and use the 
correct systems. It focuses on the ability of the force to 
engage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational 
tempo as required, throughout the full range of military 
operations. The key to precision engagement is to link the 
sensors, delivery systems, and effects during joint force 
operations.41 Offensive IO can be enhanced with precision 
engagement because IO has the capabilities to identify and 
                     41 CJCS, JV 2020, 2000, pp. 22.  
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locate critical nodes and targets for the CCTF. It has the 
ability to engage with electronic or psychological forces. 
2.  Defensive Information Operations 
Defensive Information Operations are those actions 
that protect and defend information and information systems 
by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes 
providing for the restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.42  Since it is a practical impossibility to 
defend every aspect of the infrastructure and every 
information process, defensive IO ensure the necessary 
protection and defense of information and information 
systems upon which joint forces depend to conduct 
operations and achieve objectives. 43  
For effective defensive IO, the six basic components 
and capabilities described by Waltz are critical to mission 
success. When the CCTF requires protection of their 
information systems and operations, they must focus on 
issues associated with availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and 
restorations of each system. Availability provides 
assurance that information, services, and resources will be 
accessible and usable when needed by the user. Integrity 
assures that information and processes are secure from 
unauthorized tampering. Authentication assures that only 
authorized users have access to information and services on 
the basis of controls. Confidentiality protects the 
existence of a connection, traffic flow, and information 
                     42 Waltz, 1998, pp. 301. 
43 CJCS, JP 3-13, 2000,  pp. III-1. 
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content from disclosure to unauthorized parties. 
Nonrepudiation assures that transactions are immune from 
false denial of sending or receiving information by 
providing reliable evidence that can be independently 
verified to establish proof of origin and delivery. 
Restoration assures information and systems can survive an 
attack and that availability can be resumed after the 
impact of the attack.44  
For the CCTF to safeguard information and resources it 
may secure them behind a physical or digital lock.45 The 
physical lock includes locks and keys. The CCTF must ensure 
that access and accountability for such systems is 
monitored and periodically reviewed. The use of 
cryptography within the CCTF can help ensure the security 
of electronic information. Other critical assets that 
should be available to the MPAT are digital ciphers, the 
generations and distribution of electronic keys, 
stenanography, anonymity, sanitations and the correct 
disposal of critical information.46 These methods of 
protecting and destroying electronic and physical forms of 
information help limit the availability of information to 
opposing forces. Most nations practice some form of 
information gathering against adversaries and friends in 
the form of espionage and general information gathering 
from open or closed sources. To fail to protect information 
in any one form may not jeopardize operations, however the 
inability of the MPAT to protect a combination of 
information assets may cause mission failure.   
                     44 Waltz, 1998, pp. 302. 
45 Denning, 1999, pp. 285. 
46 Denning, 1999, pp. 287.  
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Four interrelated processes comprise defensive IO; 
information environment protection, attack detection, 
capability restoration, and attack response.47  First, 
protection of the information environment is a combination 
of information systems and facilities. The protection of 
personnel and physical security will help ensure the 
information environment can operate effectively because 
this procedure contributes to information assurance. This 
protection also applies to any information medium or form, 
including hard copy, electronic, magnetic, video, imagery, 
voice, telegraph, computer, and human systems. Second, the 
ability for the CCTF IO Cell to detect attacks in a timely 
manner will initiate the ability to restore the system and 
possible counter attack if needed. Capability restoration 
relies on established procedures and mechanisms for 
prioritizing restoration of essential functions. The use of 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT), technical 
restorations, automated intrusion detection; inventory of 
systems resources, and post-attack analysis will provide 
the CCTF effective defensive IO because these methods 
indicate potential shortcomings and gaps in information 
security and management. Finally attack response is 
validation that an attack is complete. This allows the CCTF 
to trigger an IO response. Elements of the IO response can 
include electronic attack, law enforcement, diplomatic 
actions, sanctions, and military force.48 
Defensive IO must go beyond the technical protection 
of information and information systems. For the CCTF it 
must maintain the ability to protect members from the 
                     47 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. III-1. 
48 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. III-14. 
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information message and counter propaganda. For instance, 
in the summer of 1994 the world stood by and watched as the 
airwaves of Rwanda urged the mass killings of Tutsi people 
by a rival tribe the Hutu. Hutu extremists used simple 
mobile radios to urge their people to go on mass killing 
sprees.49 Men, women, and children were raped, tortured, and 
killed. The world may never know the true extent of the 
killings. A simple application of electronic warfare and 
jamming airwaves could have prevented the slaughter.50 It is 
imperative that defensive IO procedures in the CCTF address 
adversary counter propaganda and its sources be neutralized 
quickly.  
For defensive CCTF IO the theory of “Full Dimensional 
Protection” should be adopted. Full dimensional protection 
is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel 
and other assets required to decisively execute assigned 
tasks. Full dimensional protection is achieved through the 
tailored selection and application of multilayered active 
and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, 
space, and information across the range of military 
operations with an acceptable level of risk.51 To ensure 
successful defensive IO operations, the CCTF must ensure 
information superiority is obtained through full 
dimensional protection coupled with precision engagement 
within the AOR.  
3.  Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Psychological operations are planned operations to 
convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective                      49 Adams, 1998, pp. 273. 
50 Author Note: An in-depth Rwanda case study is included in Chapter 4. 
51 CJCS, JV 2020, 2000, pp. 26. 
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reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The 
purpose of psychological operations is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the 
originator’s objectives.52 PSYOP units should be integrated 
into all multinational operations. The multinational force 
commander must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless 
of national origin, are coordinated because the world’s 
almost instantaneous access to news and information makes 
it nearly impossible to localize any information campaign. 
For instance, a psychological leaflet handed out in Bosnia 
is just as likely to be shown by a reporter on the nightly 
news in the United States or Europe as it is to be read in 
Sarajevo. This can lead to an uncoordinated effort in 
various regions around the world, where the government’s 
information dissemination power is not used to its fullest 
advantage. In addition, contradictory information themes 
could be broadcast simultaneously through the various 
venues resulting in reduced effectiveness.53 
PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, 
to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational 
forces and develop communication channels that can be used 
from day one of an operation.  
                     52 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2003, pp.viii.   
53 DSB, 2000. 
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Figure 2. PSYOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION54  
 
PSYOP provides the commander with controlled channels 
to communicate with all elements of a population: 
civilians, military, or belligerent factions. PSYOP 
communicate policy, provide information, and can persuade 
groups to cooperate with multinational forces. A detailed 
analysis of a country’s culture, religion, political 
climate, and military organization can help the 
multinational force commander to effectively apply PSYOP to 
communicate policy, provide information, and persuade 
groups to cooperate with friendly forces.  
When the Armed Forces of the United States are 
integrated into a multinational command structure, 
peacetime PSYOP policies and wartime conduct should be 
                     54 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2003. 
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coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible 
for the attainment of U.S. and multinational security 
objectives. However, U.S. PSYOP normally will be approved 
in U.S. channels regardless of the composition of the 
multinational force chain of command.55 This contradiction 
between the integration and authorization of PSYOP themes 
may cause unforeseen problems. Attempts to minimize these 
contradictions must be addressed in the actual chain-of-
command structure within the CCTF. For instance, each 
nation furnishing forces to the CCTF establishes a National 
Command Element (NCE) within the CCTF command.  Normally 
this person is the senior officer in the CCTF for a given 
nation.  This establishes the national command link back to 
respective nations’ national authorities.56  
The PSYOP model used to create the MNF IO SOP follows 
the U.S. Joint Publication on PSYOP. Each type of PSYOP is 
categorized into strategic, operational, or tactical level 
psychological operations. Strategic level PYSOP is 
conducting international information activities to 
influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in 
favor of US goals and objectives. Next operational level 
PYSOP activities are designed to strengthen U.S. and 
multinational capabilities to conduct military operations 
in the operational area and accomplish particular missions 
across the range of military operations. Tactical level 
psychological operations outline how military force will be 
employed against opposing forces to attain tactical 
                     55 CJCS, JP 3-53. 2003  pp. VI-14. 
56 Author’s Note: Chapter III will present an in-depth review of the 
COC.    
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Figure 3. MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS58 
 
During operations, PSYOP are planned operations to 
convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The 
definition could also be labeled propaganda. Normally, 
propaganda is actions against the coalition and 
psychological operations are actions against the IO target. 
Regardless of how they are labeled, the effects and process 
are the same. 
 
                      57 CJCS, JP 3-53, 2003, pp. I-4. 
58 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2003. 
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4.  Military Deception (MILDEC) 
Military deception are actions executed to 
deliberately mislead military decision makers as to 
friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, 
thereby causing them to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of 
the friendly mission. The five categories of military 
deception are:  
(1) Strategic Military Deception: Military deception 
planned and executed by and in support of senior 
military commanders to result in adversary military 
policies and actions that support the originator’s 
strategic military objectives, policies, and 
operations.  
 
(2) Operational Military Deception: Military deception 
planned and executed by and in support of 
operational-level commanders to result in adversary 
actions that are favorable to the originator’s 
objectives and operations. Operational military 
deception is planned and conducted in a theater to 
support campaigns and major operations.  
 
(3) Tactical Military Deception: Military deception 
planned and executed by and in support of tactical 
commanders to result in adversary actions that are 
favorable to the originator’s objectives and 
operations. Tactical military deception is planned 
and conducted to support battles and engagements.  
 
(4) Service Military Deception: Military deception 
planned and executed by the Services that pertain to 
Service support to joint operations. Service 
military deception is designed to protect and 
enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces 
and systems. 
 
(5) Military Deception in Support of OPSEC: Military 
deception planned and executed by and in support of 
all levels of command to support the prevention of 
the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or 
classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. 
Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract 
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foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover 
for, military operations and activities.59 
 
Military deception is extremely useful during all 
operations. For instance, on the eve of World War II, the 
Red Army at Khalkhin Gol, commanded by General Zhukov, 
developed an elaborate deception plan against the Japanese 
forces in a major Manchurian border battle in August 1939. 
After a significant border incursion and clash, Zhukov's 
deception measures "were aimed at creating the impression 
that we were making no preparations for an offensive 
operation." Consequently, troop concentrations and 
redeployments were done at night, radios and telephones 
were used to pass false information, and attack groups were 
moved to their jumping-off positions shortly before the 
attack. Deception efforts and diversionary attacks served 
to cloud the Japanese estimate of Soviet activities and 
keep the Japanese assessment off-balance. According to the 
Kwantung Army command, "We had no prior clue from 
intelligence at any level, from the front to army 
headquarters, to lead us to expect there would be an 
offensive on such a scale at this time."60  The Soviets 
achieved operational surprise when Red Army forces swiftly 
surrounded the awed Japanese forces and completely 
destroyed their units. 
Recognition of the vital role that deception of all 
kinds plays in military operations is clearly evident in 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 116: 
“Historically, military deception has proven to be of 
considerable value in the attainment of national security 
                     59 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2000, pp. IV. 
60 Armstrong, 1998. 
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objectives, and a fundamental consideration in the 
development and implementation of military strategy and 
tactics. Deception has been used to enhance, exaggerate, 
minimize, or distort capabilities and intentions; to mask 
deficiencies; and to otherwise cause desired appreciations 
where conventional military activities and security 
measures were unable to achieve the desired result.”61 
5.  Operational Security (OPSEC) 
OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information 
and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to 
military operations. Furthermore, OPSEC identifies those 
actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence 
systems. It can also determine indicators that hostile 
intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted 
or pieced together to derive critical information in time 
to be useful to adversaries. OPSEC will serve to select and 
execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable 
level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary 
exploitation.62  OPSEC is ensuring operational data or 
plans aren’t conveyed to an adversary.  
OPSEC focuses on three key elements when involving 
military operations. First of all, OPSEC is concerned with 
denying critical information about friendly forces to the 
adversary. The intent is for opposing commanders, 
individuals, or groups to make faulty decisions based on 
insufficient information.63 The second element of OPSEC is 
its relation to the news media. The constant pressure and 
presence of the news media will complicate OPSEC because 
                     61 DOA, 1978, pp iii. 
62 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2000 pp. VIII. 
63 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. II-1. 
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news organizations offer commentary and may portray 
military operations incorrectly. Furthermore, the news 
media will be a source of information for opposition 
groups. Next, OPSEC can serve to delay the decision process 
of opposing IO targets.  Through OPSEC critical information 
denied to an opposing IO target can be replaced or 
refocused to support the CCTF goal of psychological 
operations by identifying for attack particular adversary 
collection, processing, analysis, and distribution 
systems.64 
OPSEC, like the other elements of IO, can support or 
interrupt the decision cycle of both the CCTF and the 
opposition commanders. As mentioned earlier, IM is 
performed at all levels, regardless of the extent of 
automation available to the CCTF. An effective IM system 
will provide a solid base for an effective IO plan and 
OPSEC will support the CCTF IO plan. The standard operating 
procedures associated with INFOSEC, OPSEC, and COMSEC are 
all anchored in an individual’s thought processes. All 
security programs rely on the mental ability of the 
individual to understand the policies and always “ do the 
right thing.” They must realize the ramifications of their 
actions, from discussing operational information on an open 
telephone line to sending people’s social security numbers 
over unclassified email.65 The control of an individual 
thought process relies on the OODA decision-making loop 
described in Figure 4. A lack of complete OPSEC in the CCTF 
can disrupt the entire decision-making cycle.   
                     64 CJCS, JP 3-13, 1998, pp. II-2. 




Figure 4. COL JOHN BOYD’S DECISION CYCLE.66 
 
The goal of OPSEC is to protect the critical 
information of the CCTF. Critical Information consists of 
information and observables about your activities, 
intentions, capabilities and/or limitations that must be 
denied to your adversary in order to keep that adversary 
from gaining a technological, economic, political or 
military advantage. Critical information varies from 
organization to organization as well as from project to 
project.67 According to the OPSEC Professionals Society that 
was established in March 1990 to further the practice of 
Operations Security as a profession, OPSEC is a five-step 
process: 
(1) Identify the Critical Information: In this step, you 
identify which information must be protected to 
ensure that your adversary does not gain a 
                     66 MindSim Corp, 2003. 
67 OPSEC Org, 2003. 
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significant advantage. To determine critical 
information, the adversary will link critical 
indicators to make assumptions or uncover logical 
patterns that provide a route to the facts or 
activities that need protection. 
 
(2) Analyze Potential Threats: In step two, you identify 
your adversaries, their goals, capabilities, and 
intentions. NOTE: The analysis of threats and the 
identification of critical information form a 
continuous cycle, where the needs and capabilities 
of the adversary are consistently evaluated against 
the critical information being considered. In other 
words, work back and forth between Step 1 and Step 
2. 
 
(3) Analyze Your Vulnerabilities: This third step is the 
heart of the OPSEC process. By now you know which 
information is critical to keeping your plan or 
project both operational and successful. You also 
know who is likely to want this plan or project to 
be derailed, as well as who is likely to want to 
steal it from you. You should have also identified 
what information would make it possible for your 
adversary to obtain your critical information in 
time to successfully derail or steal your project. 
 
(4) Risk Assessment: Is a decision making step that may 
be considered the process of balancing vulnerability 
against the threat, and then deciding if the 
resultant risk warrants applying a countermeasure. 
You will need to estimate the potential effect of 
vulnerability on your plan or project and do a cost-
benefit analysis about countermeasures.  
 
(5) Application of Countermeasures: OPSEC 
Countermeasures are any actions, which deny or 
reduce the availability of critical information to 
an adversary. The most effective countermeasures are 
simple, straightforward, procedural adjustments that 
effectively eliminate or minimize the generation of 
indicators. Following a cost-benefit analysis, 
countermeasures are implemented in priority order to 
protect vulnerabilities that have the most 
significant impact on your plan or project.68 
                     68 OPSEC Org, 2003. 
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OPSEC violations and vulnerabilities can be prevalent 
in many forms. Typical vulnerabilities include: the absence 
of guards to secure or sensitive areas, poor or non-
existent access controls, lack of software controls, and 
poor implementation of an OPSEC program.  
The gathering of one piece of unclassified data may 
not indicate actual military operations or current 
planning. However, the accumulation of numerous pieces of 
unclassified critical information may indicate operations 
and place soldiers at risk. Lt. Mike Elliot, command OPSEC 
officer for USS Kitty Hawk CV-63 state, “OPSEC is 
protective measures we put on ourselves to restrict the 
flow of information that is not necessarily classified, but 
is sensitive in nature.” Elliot also indicated that OPSEC 
works under the principle that one or more pieces of 
unclassified material can reveal classified material. By 
putting together several pieces of seemingly harmless 
information, an enemy could damage the security of a ship 
and its mission. The goal of OPSEC is to avoid giving any 
indication of what Kitty Hawk’s intentions or missions 
are.69 
6.  Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Electronic Warfare is any military action involving 
the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The 
three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: 
electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic 
warfare support.  
                     69 Beyea, 2003.  
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Electronic Attack (EA) is the division of electronic 
warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, 
directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack 
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of 
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 
capability and is considered a form of fires. EA includes: 
1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective 
use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and 
electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons 
that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their 
primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency 
weapons, particle beams).  
Electronic Protection (EP) is the division of 
electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken 
to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any 
effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic 
warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly 
combat capability.  
Electronic Warfare Support (ES) is the division of 
electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under 
direct control of, an operational commander to search for, 
intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of 
intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic 
energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, 
targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, 
electronic warfare support provides information required 
for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and 
other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, 
and homing. ES data can be used to produce signals 
intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or 
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destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature 
intelligence.70  
7.  Public Affairs (PA) 
 The media can be a powerful ally in disseminating 
truthful information regarding U.S. objectives and 
practices.71 The effective use of the media is compatible 
with being truthful and achieving clear national security 
goals. But it is also clear that all too often national 
security goals are confused with political goals and that 
political fallout from successful information warfare 
operations can result in political backlash.72 It must be 
clear to the IO cell that national security goals are not 
just the political goals of some faction of the MPAT. The 
relationship between the CCTF PAO and the IO Cell is 
critical.  
Public affairs (PA) are public information, command 
information, and community relations’ activities directed 
toward both the external and internal publics.73 For MPAT, 
the external pubic is any individual or group not directly 
associated with the military actions being conducted in the 
MNF environment. The internal public is defined as 
individuals, groups, or organizations that are directly 
involved or located within the MPAT AOR. The Military 
actions will normally result in some type of media coverage 
regardless of the scope of action involved. Almost all 
operations will be of some interest to the general public, 
local and international media, and/or the committed forces 
                     70 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2002, pp. VI. 
71 Lacey & Bill, 2000, chap. 20.  
72 Adams, 1998, pp. 278. 
73 CJCS, JP 1-02, 2000, pp. II-2. 
43 
and their families.74 Joint media and public affairs 
interactions must be considered an integral part of IO.  
The bottom line facing the IO Cell with regards to PA 
is the connection between deception and establishment of 
credibility. The desire to ensure the military’s survival 
poses a conflict for public affairs between the need to use 
deception practices such as collaborative deception, 
concealment, and omission of facts, evasion, and the need 
to maintain credibility with the media.75 For example, in 
the summer of 1862, the Confederate Army was able to 
deceive the Union Army into thinking they faced a much 
larger force than existed. The Confederates did this in 
part by planting disinformation in the Richmond, Va., and 
newspaper and by shifting troop locations.76 Current U.S. 
law and restrictions forbid deception or misleading types 
of military public affairs operations due to U.S. Title 10 
restrictions. CNN correspondent put it best when he said, 
"Don’t lie to me. You don’t always have to tell me 
everything, but don’t hype it either. If we think you're 
always hyping, we are not going to take you seriously and 
you won’t have credibility."77 
U.S. Public Affairs Officers (PAO) will not lie to 
international or local media. However, the IO Cell, the 
civil-military operations, and public affairs operations 
may be different; they should not contradict one another or 
the credibility of all three may be lost.78 Although each 
                     74 CJCS, JP 3-61, 1997, pp. III-4. 
75 Hernandez, 2002.  
76 Hernandez, 2003. 
77 Wolf Blitzer, CNN correspondent (Public Relations Tactics, 1998, p. 
18. 
78 CJCS, JP 3-61, 1997, pp. III-12. 
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cell will have different audiences and different 
informational messages, there may be an overlap of 
information. The de-confliction of the message is crucial. 
PAO are very weary when dealing with IO operators due to 
the legal aspects of IO operations. For MPAT operations, 
the mission of CCTF Public Affairs (PA) is to expedite the 
flow of accurate and timely information about the 
activities of multinational forces in the CCTF AO to the 
external and internal publics.  News media and Public 
Affairs planning and coordination must be an inherent part 
of all CCTF planning because it is a fact accepted by every 
PAO in the military that most reporters are extraordinarily 
ignorant about the subjects they cover.79  If properly 
planned and coordinated, public affairs programs can 




                     79 Adams, 1998, pp. 285. 
80 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. C10-1. 
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German Propaganda WWII
“Party Rally For Peace” dated September 2, 1939  
Figure 5. GERMAN POSTCARD “PARTY RALLY OF PEACE”81 
 
8.  Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
 Civil-military operations are the activities of a 
commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit 
relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and 
the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 
operational area in order to facilitate military 
operations, to consolidate and achieve operational 
objectives. Civil-military operations may include 
performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or 
national government. Forces have been conducting civil-
military operations for years, however only recently has 
                     81 This postcard was produced for the 1939 Nuremberg Party Rally, which 
was to be the "Party Rally of Peace." It was canceled upon the outbreak 
of World War II. Propaganda postcards were sent to Nazi party members. 
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their been an attempt to tie doctrine and action together 
regarding such operations.82  
In the past, these operations were often viewed as, 
“that nonmilitary stuff you do after the war.”83 These 
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to 
other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, 
in the absence of other military operations. Civil military 
operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by 
other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs 
and other forces. Civil-military operations will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter III under challenges 
to MNF IO.  
9.  Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
Computer Network Operations encompass both Computer 
Network Defense (CND) and Attack (CNA). CND are measures to 
protect and defend information, computers, and networks 
from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction. The 
goal of CND is to defend against an adversary’s ability to 
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves. CNA operations are used to disrupt, 
deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers 
and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves. CNA relies on the data stream to execute the 
attack while EA relies on the electromagnetic spectrum. An 
example of the two operations is the following: sending a 
code or instruction to a central processing unit that 
causes the computer to short out the power supply is CNA. 
                     82 Leonard, 2000, pp. 33. 
83 Leonhard, 1998, pp. 33.  
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Using an electromagnetic pulse device to destroy a 
computer's electronics and causing the same result is EA.  
The intent of Computer Network Attack can range from 
total paralysis to intermittent shutdown, random data 
errors, wholesale theft of information, theft of services, 
monitoring, and the injection of false message traffic.84 
First, the IO operators or attackers will penetrate the 
system. The penetration phase serves to search for 
passwords, gain access, find unused accounts, and establish 
covert access to an account. The second phase of the CNA 
attack is to penetrate and act. This phase includes actions 
to gain entry, check for surveillance and gain system 
control. Next, the goal of attack includes search 
directories, acquire useful data, evidence detection, and 
destroy surveillance and evidence. Finally, the attacker 
should replace controls and logoff.85   
Computer Network Attacks can and are likely to come 
from entities or groups opposing MPAT operations as well as 
nations states. Numerous tools are available to the IO 
warriors. For example, network scanners, packet sniffers, 
password crackers, buffer overflows, remote shutdown, 
domain name service hacks, web hacks, tampering, and social 
engineering are all widely tools available for CNA 
operations.86 The coordination between the IM, IA, IO, and 
users of any computer system must account for the 
capability and criticality of the CNA threat. Table 4 
summarizes the actions, objectives, and descriptions of the 
CNA: 
                     84 Libicki, 1996, pp. 49. 
85 Waltz, 1998, pp. 261. 
86 Dennin, 1999, pp. 209-237. 
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Invalid user gains access to system 
Denial Denial of service Disruption of message system, rendering it 




Invalid user impersonates valid user to gain 
access, then misuses facility, pretends to 




Message integrity (e.g., component, address, 
content, labeling) is compromise while in 
transit 




Transmission monitoring to measure traffic 
level, traffic source destination, or content 
Intramessage Repudiation Message system denies origin, submission, or 
delivery 
 Security context 
violation 
Security context is broken and message is 
submitted, delivered, or transferred in 
breach of security policy 
Data Storage Routing 
modification 
Corruption of routing directory 




Message integrity is compromised while in 
storage 
Table 3.    PRIMARY ACTIVE THREATS TO NETWORK MESSAGING87 
                     87 Sadeghiyan, 1992, pp. 38. 
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CND is a subset of computer network operations and 
defensive IO. The CCTF IO Cell should ensure that CND and 
defensive IO are not viewed as synonymous. As mentioned 
above, defensive IO deals with availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and 
restoration of the entire information environment. CND 
deals with the technology associated with the information 
environment as applied to computers, weapons systems, and 
electronic information sharing and distribution systems. 
Unlike CNA, where access into the system is the key, 
computer network defense attempts to limit access to 
authenticated users. The process of authentication requires 
the user to verify their identity, establish access to the 
system, and the system to verify the user.  Access controls 
serve only to restrict the processes that may be performed 
by the authenticated user attempting to gain 
authentication.88 
For MPAT operations, a host of products and procedures 
are available to protect information systems. CCTF should 
ensure firewalls are present. They provide authentication, 
packet filtering, application filtering and state and 
context analysis.  Other processes include encryption with 
the use of secret or public algorithms, digital signatures, 
and key management. The organization may also use 
vulnerability scanners, content scanners, risk analysis, 
tool updates, security advisory services, certification 
procedures, and physical security measures.89 Table 5 
summarizes the incident categories, types, and typical 
responses associated with CND operations. 
                     88 Waltz, 1998, pp. 316. 
89 Waltz, 1998, pp. 301-356.  
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Category Incident Types  Typical Response 




Increase alert status 
Tighten filters and protective 
measures for similar actions 
External 
incidents 
Scanning, probing Tighten protective measures 
 Intrusion attempts Seduce scanner  
Initiate net trace and trap measures 
Selectively deny address access 
Terminate offending connections 
 Denial of Service 
attacks 
Selectively control service responses 
Attempt source identification 
Internal 
activities 
Change in trust state 
of detection of 
invalid digital 
signature 
Change security level of system 
Terminate secure activities 
Antiviral or system diagnostic 
procedure 





Initiate antiviral or system 
diagnostics 
 System fault Change security level of system 
Terminate secure activities 
Initiate system diagnostics 
 Insider unauthorized 
access attempt 
Tighten protective measures 
Seduce insider to monitor 
Initiate trace and trap measures 
Table 4.   INCIDENT CATEGORIES, TYPES, AND RESPONSES90 
                     90 Waltz, 1998, pp. 331. 
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10.  Intelligence Support (IS) 
Intelligence and counterintelligence requirements 
include current intelligence, background studies of foreign 
countries, and intelligence and counterintelligence 
estimates. Each CCTF must evaluate its assigned missions 
and operational areas to identify specific IO intelligence 
and counterintelligence needs. The thoroughness of this 
evaluation will determine how effectively intelligence 
gathering organizations and counter-intelligence support 
organizations and produce products. Development of IO-
related intelligence and counterintelligence should be 
predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific 
collection requirements to exploit all available sources 
and techniques. It should include basic intelligence and 
country studies on foreign cultures and particular target 
groups as well as current intelligence on foreign group 
attitudes, behavior, and capabilities.  
Intelligence support has two main sources. First, open 
sources, these can be both human and technical. The MPAT 
should utilize open source intelligence in any form. 
Sources of this intelligence include foreign radio, printed 
material, diplomatic reporting, radio, and the Internet. 
The second source of intelligence support is characterized 
as closed source. Closed sources can also be either human 
or technical. Human sources can foreign agents, diplomats, 
state representatives, law enforcement, defectors, and 
friendly third-party sources.91 On the technical side, CNO 
can be supported by numerous technical sources that may be 
available to the MPAT. For instance, surveillance imagery, 
electronic signals, communications traffic, network                      91 Waltz, 1998, pp. 117. 
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analysis, network message interception, and computer 
intrusions may be available to the MPAT. Depending on the 
assets available in the AOR, a verity of sensors can 
provide detailed intelligence support to the IO Cell. Space 
assets, air platforms, ground platforms, and sea platforms 
should be considered when evaluating the IS available to 
the cell. Intelligence should be provided continually about 
specified target groups to keep IO plans and estimates 
current and to provide feedback to the CCTF. Proper 
intelligence enables clear perception and decision-making.92 
There are six basic forms of intelligence that complete the 
process of intelligence production and dissemination. A 



















Government and military decision makers define, at a 
high level of information abstraction, the knowledge 
that is required to make policy, strategy, or 
operational decisions. 
Collection Following the plan, human and technical sources of 
data are tasked to perform the collection. These 
sources include open and/or closed human or technical. 
Processing The collected data is indexed and organized in an 
information base, and progress on meeting the 
requirements of the collection plan is monitored. As a 
result of collection, this organization data may 
adjust the plan on the basis of received date. 
Analysis The organization information base processed using 
deductive inference techniques that fuse all source 
date in an attempt to answer the requester’s 
questions. 
Production Intelligence may be produced in the format of dynamic 
visualizations on a war fighter’s weapons system or in 
formal reports to policy makers.  
Application The intelligence product is disseminated to the user, 
providing answers to queries and estimates of accuracy 
of the product deliver.  
Table 5.   INTELLIGENCE CYCLE93 
 
 
F.  SUMMARY 
The IO cell must focus on precision engagement and 
full dimensional defense to be successful. All the elements 
of IO can exploit the sensors, delivery systems, and 
effects during MNF operations. They can protect the 
personnel and other assets required to decisively execute 
assigned tasks. For IO, information is the medium, and 
                     93 Waltz, 1998, pp. 113. 
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information exploitation is an opponent’s resource to be 























                     94 Adams, 1998, pp. 17. 
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 III. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF CONDUCTING MNF IO  
…Those horrible pictures of newly elected 
Panamanian Vice President Ford, covered head to 
toe with blood, beaten mercilessly.95  
     -President G.H.W. Bush, 1989 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The unique organizational structure of the MNF MPAT 
organization with a multitude of many planners from 
different nations coming together during a time of crises 
offers the IO planner and operator unique challenges. 
During MPAT operations there are always multiple chains of 
command.  Each nation’s forces fall under their national 
chain of command and the CCTF multinational chain of 
command. The National Command is never relinquished to the 
multinational chain of command. The Multinational Command 
will usually take the form of control and coordination 
within the CCTF chain of command. Each nation furnishing 
forces to the CCTF establishes a National Command Element 
(NCE) within the CCTF command.  Normally this person is the 
senior officer in the CCTF for a given nation.  This 
establishes the national command link back to respective 
nations’ military and political authorities.  The specific 
officer assigned as commander of this national command 
element may also be dual-hatted with other CCTF command and 
staff responsibilities. 
Once the C2 organization is agreed upon by the Lead Nation, 
the level of support that each participating nation 
contributes will drive the MNF operation and eventually the 
associated IO actions taken within that theater.   
                     95 President George Bush addressing the Nation, describing the current 
events in Panama and his decision to use military force, 1989. 
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There are four defined levels of MPAT support that the 
IO planner must consider. First is the idea of “General 
Support”. General support is given to the supported force 
as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof. 
The second theory of support is “Mutual Support” which is 
support which units render each other against an adversary 
because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to 
each other and to the adversary, and their inherent 
capabilities. Third, “Direct Support” is support of a 
mission requiring a designated force to support another 
specific force. And finally, “Close Support” is action of 
the supporting force against targets or objectives that are 
sufficiently near the supported force to require detailed 
integration or coordination of the supporting action with 
the fire, movement or other actions of the supported force. 
The IO SOP assumes that the type of supported called for by 
the Lead Nation is clear and the IO Cell fully understands 
the support required. Varying degrees of support may be 
required at the discretion of the Lead Nation Commander or 
CCTF Commander.  
The ability of the Lead Nation and the participating 
Nations to clearly define strategies and objectives for the 
IO Cell will offer additional challenges to IO planners. 
Challenges will include, but are not be limited to military 
operations, social interactions, and technology 
limitations.  These challenges within operations will be 
driven by the nature and level of support required and the 
command relationships constructed prior to or during MOOTW/ 
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B.  CHALLENGES  
A multitude of challenges face the MPAT organization 
and the application of IO in the MNF environment. The 
following planning factors may have significant impact on 
unity of effort and effectiveness of CCTF planning and 
operations.  These need to be fully addressed and 
acknowledged in the planning process. Though IO can be 
related to all of the addressed challenges below, technical 
agreements and the advances in information and network 
technologies (number 10 & 11 below) are the focus of this 
thesis. They offer the most unique challenges facing IO 
Cell operators in the MNF environment. Challenges include, 
but are not limited too:  
                     96 MPAT SOP, 2002. 
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(1) Differences in strategic national interests, 
objectives and policies. 
 
(2) Availability of forces. 
 
(3) Availability of strategic lift assets to deploy 
forces and equipment from national bases to the CCTF 
area of operation. 
 
(4) Access to airfields and ports adjacent to the CCTF 
Area of Operation. 
 
(5) Restrictions on movement of forces through sovereign 
territories, waters and airspace of non-
participating countries. 
 
(6) Agreed-upon coalition Rules of Engagement (ROE) and 
procedures for amending them 
 
(7) Some degree of agreed-upon SOPs for the CCTF HQ and 
its subordinate force components 
 
(8) Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) / Visiting Forces 
Agreements (VFA) among MNF participating nations and 
the host nation(s) and affected nation(s) 
 
(9) Command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence (C4I) systems interoperability and 
connectivity, plus frequency spectrum management and 
communication satellite channel availability. 
 
(10) Technical Agreements (TA) are especially critical 
for logistics coordination with MNF participants and 
the host nation.  While logistics support of MNF 
units is a national responsibility, existing 
acquisition and cross servicing and implementing 
arrangements should be used wherever possible.  This 
will simplify support of deployed forces and reduce 
duplication of support requirements in the CCTF Area 
of Operations.  Shared support for basic logistics 
functions of movement, basic sustainment (water, 
base supplies, etc.), and infrastructure support 
(port operations, rail, highway, local security) 
should be pursued to the maximum extent possible. 
 
(11) Advances in information and network technologies 
(Internet, cryptology and information assurance 
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technologies, communication satellite, off-the-shelf 
equipment, and technologies, etc.) should be built 
upon in partnership venues such as the MPAT program 
and other venues of dialogue, planning, and 
coordination.97  
 
For the IO SOP the challenges were broken down into 
three distinct challenges: military operations, social 
interactions, and technology limitations.  
1.  Military Operations  
Multinational military operations may be conducted 
during periods of both war and military operations other 
than war (MOOTW).  Each multinational operation is unique, 
and key considerations involved in planning and conducting 
multinational operations vary with the international 
situation, perspectives, motives, and values of the 
organization’s members.98 Military operations with regards 
to IO focus on the interactions and limitations of 
operations when a military action or the carrying out of a 
strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative 
military mission; the process of carrying on combat, 
including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers 
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.  
                     97 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. v.  
98 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000, pp. I-3. 
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Factors Affecting the 













Figure 6. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS99 
 
The first challenge of the MNF IO planner is the 
actual interactions of members of the IO Cell. All MNF 
members should be represented in the IO cell in positions 
to contribute, when possible, to each of the elements of 
IO.100 However, the levels of IO experience and 
understanding will differ greatly. For the cell to operate 
effectively, the unique talents of its members should be 
openly discussed as earlier as possible during operations. 
IO military operations will encompass a host of support 
from intelligence support to public affairs. The members in 
the cell may be able to offer indirect support in one of 
these roles. 
The second challenge of IO in the MNF environment will 
be Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC security denies 
adversaries information regarding intentions, capabilities, 
                     99 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000. 
100 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000. 
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and plans by providing functional and physical protection 
of people, facilities, and physical infrastructure 
components.101  For OPSEC to be effective, the sources of 
leaks and potential vulnerabilities must be identified and 
tracked. Furthermore, a key element to OPSEC is the “need 
to know” criteria. The very nature of effective IO is the 
ability for it to be covert. All members of the planning 
staff may require different levels of access to operate 
effectively in the MNF IO environment. The key will be for 
the IO Cell Chief to decide what operations and at what 
level will members be allowed to review and input into IO 
plans.  
A third challenge to military operations will be the 
prioritization of actions. All members of the IO Cell must 
focus on the interests at hand. An interest taxonomy chart 
is a useful tool for any planner. For instance, each IO 
action can be seen as a separate task. Each task has 
specific characteristics such as importance or duration to 
the overall IO plan. The planner then decides at what level 
of importance: is the IO action a primary or a secondary 
concern to the CCTF. Finally, the weight of the decision 
being made should be examined.  For instance, the IO Annex 
should include a matrix that may be utilized to focus 
















Deter terrorist actions  





Ensure flow of information 





Deny terrorist communications 





Support military operations 





Combat Terrorist Leadership 
Commit military forces 
Table 6.   INTEREST TAXONOMY102 
 
The IO cell will have to deal with from the 
multinational information release criteria when planning 
and conducting MNF IO. For the U.S., the policy is that the 
appropriate U.S. geographic combatant commander should 
issue clearly stated guidelines for the release of 
classified U.S. information to the MNF, based on existing 
policy directives and any applicable approved exceptions to 
national disclosure policy. These guidelines should be 
issued to U.S. participants only and should be specific 
enough to allow implementation down to the tactical level. 
The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of 
independent IO in support of multinational objectives.103 
The non-US members of the coalition will face the same 
challenges when dealing with coalition-classified 
                     102 Liotta, 2000, pp. 129.  
103 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000, pp. IV-13. 
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information. For IO, many of the current tools and delivery 
methods are classified and carry restrictions on foreign 
classifications. These limitations on the release of 
classified material may hinder successful IO operations.  
Finally, the MNF IO cell will face disagreements when 
dealing with IO targets and related Coalition Rules of 
Engagement (CROE). As mentioned in Chapter II, IO targets 
can vary greatly. For certain members of the MNF, the 
targeting of civilian infrastructure is appropriate if it 
meets military objectives. However, not all nations will 
agree upon the CROE and targets available for IO attack. IO 
planners must clearly understand the CROE and how they 
apply to IO. As directed in the MPAT SOP, “The Supported 
Strategic Commander should publish CROE at the earliest 
possible date after approval by the Lead Nation, in 
consultation with supporting nations’ and Supporting 
Strategic Commanders. The Supported Strategic Commander 
will make the widest possible distribution of the CROE to 
assist in overall CCTF planning and refinement as 
required.”104 Attacking the wrong target and applying the 
wrong CROE can bring into jeopardy the entire operational 
plan, not just the IO operation.  
To minimize disagreements in the CROE with regards to 
IO CROE, they must presented to higher authority with-in 
the CCTF via all chains-of-command including the host 
nation and representative commanders from participating 
nations. Each CCTF is directed to create a targeting board 
with selected representatives from each independent cell 
including the IO cell. Included at these targeting boards 
are legal representatives from participating nations if 
                     104 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. C3-F1. 
64 
available. Legal issues and CROE disagreements must be 
presented in this forum early in the planning cycle to 
avoid unforeseen consequences of illegal or immoral actions 
that may jeopardize the entire IO plan. 
2. Social Interactions 
Social interaction challenges will focus on civil-
military operations or group of planned activities in 
support of military operations that enhance the 
relationship between the military forces and civilian 
authorities and population and which promote the 
development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior 
in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.  Civil-military 
operations have usually focused on the strategic level of 
interaction between highest political authorities and 
senior military leaders. Recently the focus has expanded to 
include the nature of relationships between society and the 
military institutions the society supports. The dynamics of 
civil military relations also can include the nature of 
relationships between soldiers and sailors on weekend passes 
in the local town, whether at home or abroad.105 It includes 
the relationship between the CCTF, the host nation and the 
local authority of the town, city, or AOR.  
The social interaction issues that the IO Cell will 
face are three-fold. The problem that may be encountered 
falls in the realm of the limitation of experience between 
civilian and military decision makers.  For example, it has 
been hypothesized that military decision makers are better 
prepared to deal with current and future military decisions 
than are their civilian counterparts. Second, neither the 
civilian leadership, nor the military services have a 
common vision of the future.  Third, both parties to the 
                     105 David, 1996, pp. 5. 
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relationship, as well as the general public, are changing 
their ideas of what "correct" or "good" civil-military 
relations should be in today’s environment.106 In the ideal 
situation, the military acts as an agent of the civilian 
leadership. The solution to the problem is to generate 
civilian consensus.107 For the CCTF IO Cell and the CCTF a 
consensus of action regarding the strategic, tactical, and 
operational goals of the IO plan are crucial to maintain 
solid civil-military agreement. If the CCTF can present 
consensus, the civilian leadership may disagree, but it will 
have minimal leeway to alter the IO course of action.     
3.  Technology Limitations 
The greatest challenge to the IO cell will be 
technology. Technology limitations will encompass 
interoperability or the ability of systems, units or forces 
to provide services to and accept services from other 
systems, units, or forces and to use the services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively 
together.108 Technological limitations will be apparent in 
weapons, transportation, information, and support both 
logistical and personnel. For the IO Cell, the focus will 
remain with the limitations associated with information and 
its control. 
The United States outspends the West Europeans in the 
areas of defense modernization and R&D by a ratio of 
roughly 2:1.109 Thus, it is probable that technological 
limitations will be handled with policy “workarounds” 
rather than through technological “fixes.”110 The key to 
                     106 Snider, 1996, pp. 8. 
107 Avent, 1996, pp. 20. 
108 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000, pp. GL-6. 
109 Nichiporuk, 2000, pp. 25. 
110 Nichiporuk, 2000, pp. 27.  
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technological limitations with information is to 
standardize in and or to achieve interoperability, 
compatibility, interchangeability, and commonality. The 
MITRE CORPORATION offered one solution; they have created a 
model to help planners identify shortcomings with regards 
to C4I technologies encountered in the MNF. In their model, 
there are five level of interoperability:  
(1) Level 0 is the isolated or manual level.  
(2) Level 1 deals with a connected or peer-to-peer 
architecture.   
(3) Level 2 is Functional or distributed. 
(4) Level 3 is the Domain or integrated. 




Figure 7. LISI MODEL111 
 
Figure 7 provides a notional portrayal of what a LISI 
compatibility map might look like for a given U.S. ally or 
partner. If we assume that nodes S3–S6 are U.S. systems and 
S1–S2 are the ally’s systems, this map portrays the                      111 MITRE Corporation, 2001. 
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compatibility levels of each system-to-system interaction. 
The “L numbers” in parentheses denote the compatibility 
level of each system, and the overall level of 
compatibility between two systems is the lower of the two 
numbers. Thus, the level of compatibility between an L1 and 
an L2 system would be L1. The darker the line on the map 
above, the higher the level of compatibility.112 The above 
model offers a simple way to decide what technological 
limitations of the force may be present. The use of the  
LISI Model will offer the planner the ability to find 
compromises and work around as required. They offer the 
ability of future MPAT planners to identify and invest was 
required to help avoid future problems of the MNF. 
C.  LIMITATIONS OF IO POLICIES 
The limitations of the IO plan within the CCTF will be 
driven by three operational factors or elements of war 
fighting: time, space, force. Additionally, the interaction 
of legal aspects of IO and risk of conducting IO, will add 
additional limitations to the overall IO plan. A common 
understanding of each factor is required to ensure the IO 
Cell operates successfully when faced with the limitations 
and constraints of each. It is not easy to predict which 
factor or combination of factors will add the most limiting 
weight to an operation, however a basic understanding of 
the influencing factors of each element is required to 
minimize problems that might arise. 
If the operational factors are brought into balance, 
it will allow the CCTF more freedom to act and act 
decisively. However, one or more of these factors may limit 
the commander’s ability to act. One may require more 
                     112 Nichiporuk, 2000, pp. 28. 
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troops, more time to accomplish the mission, or more 
latitude while engaging the enemy. Information Operations 
also suffers from these limitations because there is only a 
finite amount of each factor. Furthermore, the IO cell may 
not be able to control or influence one or more of these 
factors.     
1.  Time 
During military actions, all forces will face some 
restraints when dealing with time. Few operations have an 
unlimited timeline to accomplish a mission. Leadership, 
diplomatic, media, and local pressure can force an end to 
an operation. Furthermore, many operations fail to maintain 
support because the correlation between time and 
accomplishment of the mission is not linear.  
Time has numerous driving forces. The IO Cell must 
consider them all. Time considerations include preparation, 
information handling, intelligence, the decision cycle, 
warning, reaction, counteraction, and C2. One or more of 
these factors will drive operational planning within the 
MPAT. Time is the most important element with regards to 
operational factors. The factor time is defined as with the 
time that it takes the commander to execute one cycle 
through an OODA loop.113 This time is related to the 
duration of the sub-activities within the OODA loop, 
including the time to observe/sense, orient/process and 
compare, decide, and act. Time assets and never be 
recovered; space and force may be corrected. Table 5 
summarizes the factors affecting time: 
 
                     113 Mclure, 2000, pp. 21.  
69 
TIME CONSIDERATIONS NOTE: 
Preparation How long does it take to create the IO plan? 
 How long to get IO forces in the AOR? 
Information 
Gathering 
How long does it take me to gather process and 
disseminate information? 
Decision Cycle How long does it take a decision to be made once 
the information is gathered? 
Timing When should I do it? 
Warning How much warning time do I have? 
Reaction How long does it take him or me to react to an IO 
task? 
C2 How quickly does the C2 organization work? 
Between Operations How much time do I have between operations? 
Gaining and Losing When and where will I gain or loss time? 
Duration Will my actions prolong the operation? 
Table 7.   TIME LIMITATIONS114  
 
2.  Space 
Space or battlespace elements will offer vary unique 
challenges for the IO Cell. Space will include shape, 
geography, terrain, and physical elements of the theater, 
military organization, distances, physical characteristics, 
and geostrategic position. Advances in technology, 
information age media reporting, and the compression of 
time-space relationships contribute to the growing 
interrelationships between time, space, and force. CCTF’s 
should ensure that their joint operations are integrated 
and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the 
actions of other military forces (multinational 
                     114 Mclure, 2000, pp. 28. 
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operations).115 To achieve this, synchronization must take 
place in the physical domain (potentially in the 
information domain as well, in the case of information 
operations) to create effects in the battlespace.116 
3.  Force 
The next factor affecting any IO operations is the 
question of force. The consideration affecting the force 
and its structure are numerous. The CCTF and the IO Cell 
must decide on the more important ones, a risk-based 
calculation is required. Force considerations include: 
size, type, mix, flexibility, combat power, transportation, 
organization, reserves, logistics, mobility, weapons, and 
equipment. Any one of these elements may be the key to 
successful operations. Other operational factors of force 
will include public support, the will to fight, training, 
leadership, moral, soundness of doctrine, and the overall 
combat readiness of troops.  
For the IO Cell the organization of the cell is one of 
the most crucial aspects. Organization and structure of the 
cell will include numerous operators and managers all with 
different goals. For instance, the IO Cell should include a 
PA representative and an Intel representative, each will 
have different directives and goals. How well the IO Cell 
relates to individual members inside and outside the cell, 
may ultimately affect the success or failure of the IO 
operation. 
4.  Legal 
The growth in IO related technology and capabilities 
and associated legal issues makes it critical for 
                     115 CJCS, JP 3-0, 2001, pp. II-6.  
116 David, 1996, pp. 73. 
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commanders at all levels of command to involve their staff 
judge advocates in development of IO policy and conduct of 
IO.117 The guidance given to the MPAT is that selected 
International Agreements, Law of Armed Conflict, Treaties 
Governing Land Warfare, The Law of Land Warfare, and other 
applicable armed conflict legal guidelines and documents 
will govern CCTF forces in the conduct of operations. 
Commanders are responsible to ensure persons subject to 
their authority are aware of the limitations and standards 
imposed by international law and that personnel adhere to 
such standards.118 However, this guidance is limited and a 
further discussion of the legal limitations of IO is 
required. 
 IO can be an offensive weapon thus the Laws of 
Armed Conflict and the Principles of War apply to almost 
all IO operations. IO will face all challenges of any 
military action in the courts and in the public. 
Specifically, IO issues may involve of the Law of 
Neutrality, Law of War, and Perfidy versus Lawful 
Deception, Law Enforcement, and Communications Monitoring. 
The emerging discipline of IO synthesizes laws and policies 
related to intelligence collection and oversight, space 
law, computer security, psychological operations, mission 
planning, law of armed conflict targeting constraints, 
information security and exploitation, and search and 
seizure guidelines. There are many areas where current laws 
contain gaps, which can frustrate commanders who seek 
                     117 CJCS, JP 3-16, 2000, pp. II-8.  
118 MPAT SOP, 2002, pp. C9-5. 
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crystal clear answers for important operation issues.119 























                     119 Lacey, et al., 2000, chap. 20.  
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LAW/ISSUE DESCRIPTION 
Law of Neutrality  All acts of hostility in neutral territory, including 
neutral lands, waters, and airspace are prohibited. 
Using wires or digital cables of a networked 
associated with a neutral party, as a conduit for IO 
would jeopardize that State’s neutrality.  
Law of War The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population are prohibited. 
 The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring 
the enemy is not unlimited. 
 Those who plan or decide upon attack shall take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view of avoiding, and in any 
event, to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
targets. 
 The collateral damage may not be excessive in 
relation to the direct and concrete military obtained 
through the destruction of the intended target. 
Perfidy  Prohibits belligerents from killing, injuring, or 
capturing and adversary by perfidy. 
Law Enforcement  U.S. military does not engage in law enforcement. 
COMSEC COMSEC monitoring IO campaign is permitted. 
 Information Systems Security Monitoring will be 
conducted only in support of security objectives. 
 Information Systems Security Monitoring will not be 
performed to support law enforcement or criminal or 
counterintelligence investigations.  
Table 8.   IO AND LAW120                      120 Lacey, et al., 2000. 
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Problems when operating in a multinational force 
structure may be complicated by varying national 
obligations derived from international agreements. Other 
coalition members may not be parties to treaties that bind 
the United States, or treaties to which the United States 
is not a party may bind them. U.S. forces will comply with 
the Law of War during military operations involving armed 
conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized 
under international law, and will comply with its 
principles and spirit during all other operations. 
Furthermore, U.S. forces assigned to the operational 
control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a 
multinational force will follow the ROE of the 
multinational force for mission accomplishment if 
authorized by the National Command Authority (NCA).121 IO 
Cell operators must familiarize themselves with the Status 
of Forces Agreements and must ensure all IO actions are 
cleared through legal representatives.  
5.  Risk 
Risk will always be an integral part of any 
information operation; it is unavoidable. Those unable to 
understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are 
equally unable to understand the advantages way of doing 
so.122 The tradeoff between benefits of information access 
and the consequences of attacks by imposing threats 
requires a management of the level of risk imposed upon the 
system.123 Risk in its most basic form can be described by 
the equation: 
                     121 CJCS 3121.01A, 2000, pp. A-1. 
122 Tzu, 1975, pp. 73. 
123 Waltz, 1998, pp. 156. 
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Risk = [Threat x Vulnerabilities/ Protection] x Impact 
The IO Annex has gone beyond this simple equation to 
help planners assess the risk involved in IO. For instance, 
utilizing a combination of author created and standard U.S. 
IO handbook created charts in the IO Annex, the operator 
will be able to assign numbers to risk. For example, when 
dealing with the “Opposition’s conduct of the Activity”, by 
assigning a number to each and calculating the total, the 
risk can be determined. The IO Annex provides an IO task 
selection tool. Each included form drives the planner to 
calculate the best and most effective IO tool to complete 
an assigned mission. Forms 1 through 7 establish the 
specific and implied tasks, Forms 8 through 22 refine the 
task and assign IO tools to complete the task. For example, 
the Commander’s assigned task is: To neutralize Iraqi 
guerillas ability to coordinate attacks and to expose 
resistance members. Examples of Form 8 and 9 below explain 
how activity and benefit are calculated to help aid the 
planner.  
 
(1) FORM 8: Opposition Activities will be affected. 
a. IO objective:  “The U.S. will diminish the 
guerillas’ ability to communicate to resistance 
members”  
b. Opposition Activities that will be affected: 
i. Lines of Communications,  
ii. Recruitment opportunities,  
iii. Planning and organization of attacks,  
iv. Administration activities,  
v. The ability to communicate critical 
information to operators and planners of 
attacks. 
 
(2) FORM 9: Identify the Functions that most 





Table 9.   OPPOSITION’S CONDUCT OF THE ACTIVITY124 
 
Additional charts are used throughout the SOP. Charts 
are provided for evaluating tasks, evaluate and targets 
associated to identify the ones most critical to the 
success, and identifying IO assets. Each chart and the 
total calculated by operator input will produce 
calculations required by the IO Cell to help assess the 
risk of any IO offensive or defensive action when selecting 
IO tasks.  Additional calculations can also be found in the 
IO Annex. For example, Figure 8 “FORM 20: COST/BENEFIT/RISK 
of IO Asset” can be utilized to calculate enemy COA against 
MPAT IO actions. Each possible COA has separate 
calculations complied to add the planners. The risk 
calculations can be compared to the cost of the action and 
the benefits of the action. These calculations can be 
completed for N number of assets. Continuing with the 



























.5 .5 .33 .2 .5 .231 .2 .5 .231 .792 
Engage in 
CNO 
.8 .5 .429 .5 .8 .429 .5 .8 .429 1.287 
Increased 
recruiting 
.2 .5 .231 .8 .2 .333 .2 .5 .231 .777 
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previous example, FORM 19 and 20 help streamline the IO 
task being reviewed to meet mission objectives by 
calculating risk. For instance:  
FORM 19: Identify the IO Asset. 
(1) CNO  
a. Apportioned = YES  
b. Assigned = YES  
c. Allocated = YES  
d. Deployed = YES   
e. In-commission (not battle-damaged or 
destroyed) = YES 
f. Availability = HIGH (.8),  
g. Duration (.2) = MED (.5),  
h. Delivery Error (.2) = LOW (.2),  
i. Probability of Effect (.2) = MED (.5),  
j. Asset Reliability (.2) = MED (.5) 
(2) PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION 
a. Apportioned = YES,  
b. Assigned = YES,  
c. Allocated = YES,  
d. Deployed = YES,  
e. In-commission (not battle-damaged or 
destroyed) = YES 
f. Availability = MED (.5),  
g. Duration (.2) = MED (.5),  
h. Delivery Error (.2) = LOW (.2),  
i. Probability of Effect (.2) = LOW (.2),  
j. Asset Reliability (.2) = MED (.5) 




FORM 20: COST/BENEFIT/RISK 
of IO Asset #1 against 
• Cost (.33):  
– Consequences = LOW (.5)
– Number = LOW (.8)
– Value = High (.8) 
• Risk  (.33): 
– Prob. Failure = Med (.5) 
– Consequences of Failure = High (.5)  
– Capability of Compromise = LOW (.8) 
– Collateral Damage = LOW (.5)
• Benefit (.33): 
– Prop of Success = High (.5) 
– Political Acceptability = MED (.2)
– Confidence = HIGH (.2)
– Impact = MED (.5)
– Reconstitution = LOW (.8)
• Total: 2.112
  
FORM 20: COST/BENEFIT/RISK 
of IO Asset #2 against 
• Cost (.33):  
– Consequences = LOW (.2)
– Number = LOW (.2)
– Value = High (.8) 
• Risk  (.33): 
– Prob. Failure = Med (.5) 
– Consequences of Failure = High (.8)  
– Capability of Compromise = LOW (.2) 
– Collateral Damage = LOW (.2)
• Benefit (.33): 
– Prop of Success = High (.8) 
– Political Acceptability = MED (.5)
– Confidence = HIGH (.8)
– Impact = MED (.5)
– Reconstitution = LOW (.2)
• Total: 1.815
 
Figure 8. COST/ BENEFIT/ RISK CALCULATION 
 
From the Form 19 and 20 above, the calculations 
indicate that the overall cost vice risk and expected 
benefit indicate that against our example task “To 
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neutralize Iraqi guerillas ability to coordinate attacks 
and to expose resistance members”, the option of CNO is 
more viable given in theater assets. These simple 
calculations offer the planners the ability to present to 
commanders a calculation based assessment of each IO task. 
The cost of completing such calculations is limited by the 
scope the planner is willing to endure per IO task and the 
time allotted for planning each task and completing the 
calculations.  
E.  SUMMARY 
All information warriors, staffs, and coalitions are 
going to encounter challenges, limitations, and risk when 
conducting IO in the CCTF. Military interactions, social 
disagreements, technological limitations, and operational 
factors of time, space, and force will cause the greatest 
and most unforeseen problems. These problems can be 
minimized with constant synchronization of plans and 
adjustments made prior to and during the execution phases 
of IO. IO deals with the control, manipulation, and the 
flow of information within and outside the AOR. However, 
within the CCTF and the IO cell, information and discussion 
must flow freely. All members, regardless of their 
associated limitations, must have input into the IO plans 
and operations because the assignment of forces and 
missions in ad hoc coalitions must reflect the unique 



























IV. CASE REVIEW 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This case study is presented because it case unique 
lessons learned regarding an inadequate focus on IO.  The 
case serves to explore how IO was used during the conflict 
to meet strategic and operational ends. Specifically, the 
study will focus on propaganda, deception, and civil-
military operations as used in Rwanda. It is an examination 
of possible themes, IO targets or sources that a group or 
state may attempt to utilize during MOOTW/SCC.  
Rwanda was chosen because it illustrates, even given 
the limitations of technology are within the region; the  
other aspects of IO including the use of psychological and 
civil military are still relevant. It also offers insight 
into the complexity of processes and procedures, associated 
with the deployment of multi-national forces and the 
consequences of the international community failing to act 
effectively within the information battlespace. 
B.  RWANDA 
1. Background 
In the summer months of 1994, the African nation of 
Rwanda was plunged into civil war, ethnic cleansing, and 
massive acts of genocide. It is estimate that 1 million 
Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu men, women, and 
children were killed or tortured based on their ethnic and 
political backgrounds.126 In October of 1990, soldiers led 
by Major General Fred Gisa Rwigyema separated from the 
Uganda National Republican Army and attacked Rwanda. The 
government of Rwanda, led by President Habyarimana, fought 
                     126 Keane, 1995, pp. 10. 
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back for the next four years as the international community 
watched. In July of 1992, negotiations began on the Arusha 
Peace Accords between the warring factions. By August 1993, 
the accords and the signings were completed. However, power 
struggles continued between the two sides throughout the 
year. As violence increased, the country began to tear 
itself apart. And finally in April of 1994, the genocide 
began and was fueled by radio addresses, newspaper 
articles, and political speeches.  Major events that led to 
months of genocide in Rwanda were:  
(1) 1989: The coffee price collapses, causing severe 
economic hardship in Rwanda. 
 
(2) 1990, July: Under pressure from western aid 
donors President Habyarimana concedes the 
principle of multi-party democracy. 
  
(3) 1990, October: Guerrillas of the recently formed 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invade Rwanda from 
Uganda. After fierce fighting in which French and 
Zairean troops are called in to assist the 
government, a ceasefire is signed on 29 March 
1991.  
(4) 1990/91: The Rwandan army begins to train and arm 
civilian militias known as the Interahamwe. For 
the next three years Habyarimana stalls in the 
establishment of a genuine multi-party system 
with power sharing. Throughout this period 
thousands of Tutsis are killed in separate 
massacres around the country. Opposition 
politicians and newspapers are persecuted. 
 
(5) November, 1992: Prominent Hut activist Dr Leon 
Mugusera appeals to Hutus to send the Tutsis 
‘back to Ethiopia’ via the rivers. 
 
(6) February 1993: The RPF launches a fresh 
offensive. The guerrillas reach the outskirts of 
Kigali and French forces are again called in to 




(7) August 1993: At Arusha in Tanzania, following 
months of negotiations, Habyarimana agrees to 
power sharing with Hutu opposition and the RPF. 
2,500 UN troops are deployed in Kigali to oversee 
the implementation of the accord. 
 
(8) September 1993- March 1994. President Habyarimana 
stalls on setting-up of power-sharing government. 
Extremist radio station, Radio Mille Collines, 
begins broadcasting exhortations to attack Tutsi. 
Human rights groups warn the international 
community of impending calamity. 
 
(9) March 1994: Many Rwandan human rights activists 
evacuate their families from Kigali, believing 
massacres are imminent. 
 
(10) 6 April 1994: President Habyarimana and the 
president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, are 
killed as their plane is shot down while landing 
at Kigali Airport.  
 
(11) 7 April 1994: The Rwandan armies’ forces and the 
Interahamwe set up roadblocks and go from house 
to house killing Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
politicians. Thousands die on the first day. UN 
forces stand by while the slaughter goes on. They 
are forbidden to intervene because their mandate 
states to monitor the situation.  
 
(12) 8 April 1994: The RPF launches a major offensive 
to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops 
surrounded in Kigali. The troops had been based 
in the city as part of the Arusha accords. 
 
(13) 21 April 1994: The UN cuts the level of its 
forces from 2,500 to 250 following the murder of 
ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the 
moderate Hutu prime minister. He is killed and 
the Belgians are disarmed, tortured, shot and 
hacked to death. They had been told not to resist 
violence by the UN force commander, as it would 
have breached their mandate. 
 
(14) 30 April 1994: The UN Security Council spends 
eight hours discussing the crises. The resolution 
omits the word “genocide”. If the term had been 
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used, the UN would have been legally obligated to 
act based on their current mandate.  
 
(15) 17 May 1994: As the slaughter of the Tutsis 
continues the UN finally agrees to send 6,800 
troops and policemen to Rwanda with powers to 
defend civilians. The deployment of troops is 
delayed because of arguments over who will pay 
the bill and provide the equipment. The United 
States argues with the UN over the cost of 
providing heavy armored vehicles for the 
peacekeeping force. 
 
(16) 22 June 1994: With still no sign of UN 
deployment; the Security Council authorizes the 
deployment of French forces in southwest Rwanda. 
They created a safe area in territory controlled 
by the government. Killings of Tutsis continue in 
the safe area, although the French protects some 
civilians. The United States government 
eventually uses the word ‘genocide’. 
 
(17) July 1994: The final defeat of the Rwandan army. 
The government flees to Zaire, followed by a 
human tide of refugees. The French end their 
mission and are replaced by Ethiopian UN troops. 
 
According to the current government of Rwanda, “The 1994 
genocide was a carefully planned and executed exercise to 
annihilate Rwanda's Tutsi population and Hutus who did not 
agree with the prevailing extremist politics of the 
Habyarimana regime. One million lives were lost in only one 
hundred days. It is the fastest and most vicious genocide 
yet recorded in human history.”127 Currently, a policy of 
decentralization has been initiated to involve people in 
grassroots communities in decision-making. This will 
enhance their participation in activities to transform 
their poor conditions. However, current indications are that 
Tutsi, Hutu, and other conflicting ethnic groups, 
                     127 Official Website of the Government of Rwanda, http:// 
www.rwanda1.com/government/rwandalaunchie. dated 22 Oct 2004.  
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associated political rebels, armed gangs, and various 
government forces continue fighting in the Great Lakes 
region, transcending the boundaries of Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. Government 
leaders pledge to end conflicts, but localized violence 
continues despite UN peacekeeping efforts.128 
2.  IO in Rwanda 
Rwanda had only limited sources of information 
operations assets available during the crises. First, there 
were two AM radio stations, one FM station based in Kigali 
(with several repeaters), one Indian Ocean INTELSAT, one 
SYMPHONIE satellite, and limited newspapers. However, even 
though it is estimated that 66 percent of Rwandans are 
literate, the written word and the message was often 
translated into graphic and violent cartoons.129 Even with 
high literacy rates present throughout the region, leaders 
of the genocide believed their actions would be understood 
more clearly with graphic and violent cartoons that could 
be easily circulated to the most remote regions of the 
country. Graphic and violent cartoons would help incite 
further violence. Furthermore, the country lacks computers 
and televisions. This lack of technology required the 
warring factions to turn to the only source of information 
dissemination available, the radio. 
                     128 CIA Fact Book, 2003.  
129 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 67. 
86 
 
Figure 9. RWANDA POLITICAL CARTOON130 
The key tool in the genocide was the radio. In 1991, 
29 percent of all households had a radio. Prior to and 
during the genocide, the government distributed free radios 
to local authorities. Those without radios would listen to 
broadcast in local bars or the word was passed from 
neighbor to neighbor. For instance, governmental controlled 
Radio Rwanda was used mainly be the President and his 
allies to broadcast false information about the war.131 With 
limited radio stations, no television, and government-
controlled newspapers, independent verification of events 
was not possible. The President and his staff controlled 
the information domain. The RPF also understood the power 
of the radio and they went on the air soon after the war 
started. Hutu hard-liners needed a voice. They soon created 
Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in April 
1993.  
                     130 Authors Note: Political Cartoon to support the RTLM. The following 
summons was transmitted on the RTLM: Everyone who is listening to us 
rise to the fight for our Rwanda. … Take whatever weapons you have, 
those who have arrows, take arrows, those who have spears, take spears 
…We all must fight against Tutsi, we must do away with them, we must 
destroy them and wipe them off the face of the earth. 
http://www.yhca.org.md/J9/Rwanda.html 
131 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 68. 
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RTLM used the airwaves to their fullest extent 
possible. Not only were instructions on how to conduct acts 
of genocide, broadcast radio was utilized to recall retired 
soldiers, summon the personnel needed for special tasks, 
and offer accounts of the war.132 Not only were the 
announcer’s voices heard throughout the country, 
politicians, soldiers, and even clergymen often used radio 
broadcasts to encourage the killings. The goal of the 
broadcasts was to highlight the differences in ethnicity of 
the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. Their messages focused on 
cruelty, cohesiveness, repression, revolution, and 
extermination. Furthermore, the radio offered warnings to 
all. For instance, one address stated, “…those who desert 
the barriers could expect severe punishments, just as the 
soldier’s who deserted the battlefront.”133 To the 
international community, the message was clear; these were 
not acts of genocide, but merely “battles” and “interethnic 
fighting”. Just as organizers used genocide to wage the 
war, they used the war to disguise the genocide.134 
IO techniques, including deception and psychological 
operations were used in Rwanda by the government. Their 
deception goals were three fold. First, they wanted to 
mislead foreigners as to the nature of events in order to 
avoid criticism and perhaps even win support. Next, they 
wanted to mislead Tutsi to make them easier to kill. 
Finally, they wanted to engage and manipulate Hutus into 
participating energetically in the genocidal program.135  
The government accomplished these goals by creating events                      132 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 250. 
133 RTLM, 1994. 
134 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 252 
135 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 252. 
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to lend credence to propaganda. Also, the idea of 
“Accusation in a mirror”, the idea that one should impute 
to enemies exactly what one’s own faction is planning to 
do. In other words, the party, which is planning terror, 
will accuse the enemy of using terror (i.e. psychological 
operations).136  
Other methods of IO included the use of public affairs 
and civilian military operations intended to control the 
media, foreign aid workers, and UN forces access to 
information regarding the genocide.  For instance, the RPF 
established close control over foreigners working or 
traveling in areas under its authority. Information and 
liaison officers worked hard at shaping the ideas of 
outsiders while persons employed by foreigners were ordered 
to report on their activities and conversations. Ordinarily 
journalists and aid workers were allowed to travel in RPF 
territory only in the company of officially designated 
“guides” who sought to ensure that they travel just to 
approve areas, usually via the main roads. The RPF closed 
whole regions to UNAMIR and other foreign observers for 
weeks at a time.137 
Almost all Information Operations tools were present 
in Rwanda except for vary technical means such as CNO and 
EW. This case also serves to remind the planner that IO is 
more than just technology. Any group or individual 
regardless of their accessibility to the most current both 
military and commercial technologies can utilize 
information operations. Table 10 summarizes IO tools and 
techniques used in Rwanda. Note the lack of sophisticated 
                     136 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 66.  
137 FIDH, 1994. 
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technology based tools, yet the IO campaign was extremely 
effective and deadly.  
 
IO Method IO Asset Used Description/Example 
Psychological 
Warfare 
Radio Two AM radio stations, 
one FM station based 
in Kigali 
 Television Only elites had access 
to limited broadcasts 
on international 
concerns 
 Newspaper Demographic majority 
equals democratic rule 
thus equals democracy 
 Leaflets/ Cartoons  
Propaganda Radio Majority rule is 
democratic rule 
 Political Rallies Incite violence   
OPSEC Physical Theft Control land 
development for elites 
MILDEC Confuse foreigners  Limited access to 
regions during 
genocide 
 Mislead Tutsi civilians Legitimate government 
equals legitimate 
killings 
EW Not present  Not present  
IA Data storage They kept track of 
deaths and distributed 
lists of the names to 
be killed 
Counterdeception Ruling party agrees to power- Habyarimana stalls in 
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share to please international 
concerns, however no intention 
of sharing 
the establishment of a 
genuine multi-party 
system with power 
sharing 
Counterintelligence Control on information No more authorizations 
for travel to adjacent 
countries, must have 




Sabotage President Habyarimana 
and the president of 
Burundi, Cyprien 
Ntaryamira, are killed 
their plane is shot 
down The killings 
begin 
 Murder Killing, and 
mutilating 10 Belgian 
soldiers in the UN 
CNO Not present  Not present 
Civil-Military 
Affairs 
Control of Foreign Media Via official “guides” 
 Control of Foreign Workers Limited area where 
they could work 
 Control of Foreign Aid 
agencies 
Limited the area and 




 Censorship Government controlled 
media 
Table 10.   EXAMPLES OF IO IN RWANDA138 
 
                     138 Prunier, 1995. 
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3.  Use of Force 
The policy makers of the world understood the gravity 
of the situation almost immediately. Intelligence reports 
and the media were quick to disseminate the information.   
However, due to different national interests true action 
never came. For instance, Belgium was focused on extracting 
its peacekeepers, the U.S. on avoiding committing resources 
to crises remote from U.S. concerns, and France wanted to 
protect its clients and its zone of influence.139 The UN 
faired no better. Their goal was simply to broker a cease-
fire in the region. Through the UN force, UNAMIR had 
specific ROE that included direction that they were morally 
and legally obligated to use all available means to halt 
ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts, they 
lacked the troops, training, supplies and experience to 
truly intervene in the crises.140 The Rwandan IO plan 
provided sufficient confusion that nation states and the 
U.N. were able to avoid responding to the developing 
crises. 
As the carnage continued and a robust response by the 
U.S. or others was not forthcoming, human rights groups, 
members of Congress, and others urged the Clinton 
Administration to counter or “jam” extremist radio 
broadcasts in Rwanda.  These broadcasts spread fear amongst 
the Rwandan populace, urged participation in the killing, 
shamed those who sought not to participate, and in many 
cases, specifically named and provided the whereabouts of 
those to be killed.  As such, the radio broadcasts were 
essential to the fulfillment of the program of 
                     139 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 595. 
140 Des Forges, 1999, pp. 596. 
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extermination.  In a memo, Frank Wisner, the number three 
official at the Pentagon during the crises, acknowledges 
internal discussions about the feasibility of countering 
the hate radio were conducted. However, that undertaking 
the initiative to “jam” the radio would be “ineffective and 
expensive”; a “wiser” activity would be to assist the 
“relief effort”.141 
4.  The Genocide Continues   
When the genocide occurred, the words Tutsi and Hutu 
became synonymous with slaughter in the eyes of the 
international community. For most in the international 
community outside Africa in 1994, African news is only big 
news when there are a lot of dead bodies.142 Other terms 
such as “tribal war” and “peasant revolt” were used instead 
of genocide. The United Nations stung by the intervention 
in Somalia and fearing another ambiguous mission did not 
take decisive action to intervene.143 Neither Belgium and 
France, nor the United States, were serious about 
intervention because national interests were not at stake. 
In May 1994, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali admitted 
that the international community had failed the people of 
Rwanda in not halting the genocide. In 1998, U.S. President 
Bill Clinton apologized for not having responded to Rwandan 
cries for help and Secretary-General Kofi Annan also 
expressed regret. Various other world leaders have 
acknowledged responsibility for their failure to intervene 
in the slaughter. The archbishop of Canterbury apologized 
on behalf of the Anglican Church and the Pope has called 
                     141 Ferroggiaro, 2001.   
142 Keane, 1995, pp. 29. 
143 Dallaire, 1998, pp. 2. 
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for clergy who are guilty to have the courage to face the 
consequences of their crimes.144 
5. Lessons Learned 
Rwanda offers valuable lessons for future conflicts. 
The use and misuse of information was critical to both 
sides during the conflict. IO planners must remember that 
Rwanda teaches that even technologically challenged IO 
targets can wield enormous amounts of power. Rwanda was not 
a radical uprising of local farmers and disorganized 
youths, it was a well planned and executed genocide by 
those wishing to maintain power. They understood that they 
lacked the direct military and civil might to control the 
country, thus they manipulated the population, installing 
fear and mistrust among them. They utilized the radio, to 
distribute direction and propaganda, and watched as the 
genocide unfolded.  
Propaganda was again demonstrated to be an extremely 
dangerous tool when used correctly. For the killers of 
Rwanda, it was the primary IO tool. Nearly all the tenets 
of propaganda were used in Rwanda.  A lesson for the IO 
cell is how to recognize and counter propaganda. For 
effective full dimensional protection, the IO Cell must be 
aware of the common techniques. 
(1) Name Calling: The name-calling technique links a 
person, or idea, to a negative symbol. The 
propagandist who uses this technique hopes that the 
audience will reject the person or the idea on the 
basis of the negative symbol, instead of looking at 
the available evidence.   
 
(2) Glittering generalities: "We believe in, fight for, 
and live by virtue words about which we have deep-
set ideas. Such words include civilization, 
Christianity, good, proper, right, democracy,                      144 Des Flores, 1999, pp. 254. 
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patriotism, motherhood, fatherhood, science, 
medicine, health, and love. 
 
(3) Euphemism: When propagandists use glittering 
generalities and name-calling symbols, they are 
attempting to arouse their audience with vivid, 
emotionally suggestive words. In certain situations, 
however, the propagandist attempts to pacify the 
audience in order to make an unpleasant reality more 
palatable. This is accomplished by using words that 
are bland and euphemistic. 
 
(4) Transfer: Is a device by which the propagandist 
carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige 
of something we respect and revere to something he 
would have us accept. For example, most of us 
respect and revere our church and our nation. If the 
propagandist succeeds in getting church or nation to 
approve a campaign in behalf of some program, he 
thereby transfers its authority, sanction, and 
prestige to that program. Thus, we may accept 
something, which otherwise we might reject. 
 
(5) Bandwagon: He appeals to the desire, common to most 
of us, to follow the crowd. Because he wants us to 
follow the crowd in masses, he directs his appeal to 
groups held together already by common ties, ties of 
nationality, religion, race, sex, vocation. 
 
(6) Fear: When a propagandist warns members of her 
audience that disaster will result if they do not 
follow a particular course of action, she is using 
the fear appeal. By playing on the audience's deep-
seated fears, practitioners of this technique hope 
to redirect attention away from the merits of a 
particular proposal and toward steps that can be 
taken to reduce the fear.145 
 
The second lesson learned that Rwanda offers is an 
insight into civil-military and public affairs operations. 
Rwanda military and civilian officials controlled the 
information that would flow between the entities of the 
media, relief workers, and diplomats. Furthermore, they 
                     145 LSU, 2003.  
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were very careful to create what was shown and the 
information that was leaked to any one element. For 
instance, it became clear that blanket genocide would 
eventually be resisted and they took active steps to cover 
these actions. Thus the Rwandan government instituted a 
process of selected killings or “pacification” killings. 
The pacification killings were an attempt to target 
selected groups or individuals. Their attempt to shift the 
target was also used as an example to show that they were 
stopping the genocide. However, this was just another 
deception operation. Authorities drove through Butare town 
and its environs beginning on April 23, making 
announcements over a sound system or through a hand-held 
megaphone. One announcement said, “signs of the killing 
must be hidden from journalists flying over in helicopters 
and from surveillance satellites passing overhead”. 146 The 
IO Cell must be alert to shifts in process or plans within 
an AOR. These shifts can drastically change the nature of 
the IO plan or the target audience. 
The final lesson learned in Rwanda related to IO 
involves the message itself. MPAT planners must understand 
what are the critical information messages of the adversary 
and what the opponent’s objectives. For example, the goal 
of the main message in Rwanda was to split the society on 
racial ideologies. Early in the campaign, the propagandists 
relied heavily on the idea that the Hutu and Tutsi where 
radically different. Next, the message relayed informed the 
population that they must exterminate Tutsi killers before 
they kill Hutus. Finally, the propagandists stressed that 
Tutsi were foreign to the area and had stolen Rwanda from 
                     146 FIDH, 1995. 
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its rightful inhabitants.147 When IO operators receive 
intelligence reports regarding opposition messages within 
the AOR, they must examine them for the following ideas or 
themes: 
(1) Unity: The state or quality of being in accord or 
harmony. The idea of a homogenous culture. For 
instance in Rwanda, propaganda included, “A 
cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly.”  
 
(2) Infiltration: To penetrate with hostile intent. For 
example, in Rwanda “It is because of this Tutsi 
infiltration into society that the country has no 
more secrets and they have been able to invade it 
with no trouble at all.” 
 
(3) Restoring Old Regimes: A form of government, 
normally fascist.  In defining the “enemy,” the 
military high command focused on those Tutsi “who 
refused to accept the revolution and wanted to re 
conquer power by any means.” 
 
(4) Genocide: The systematic and planned extermination 
of an entire national, racial, political, or ethnic 
group. They insisted that not just the freedom and 
prosperity of Hutu were at risk but their very 
lives. They warned that the Tutsi minority could not 
hope to reestablish their control over the majority 
without killing large numbers of Hutu 
 
(5) Innocent Victim: One who is harmed by or made to 
suffer from an act, circumstance, agency, or 
condition: victims of war. Underlying much of this 
propaganda is the image of the Hutu as the innocent 
victim—victim of the original aggression by Tutsi 
conquerors some centuries ago, of the “infiltration” 
of the state and society, and of the 1990 invasion. 
 
(6) They Cause Their Own Misfortune: Ill luck. According 
to the propagandists, the suffering of the Hutu was 
real and grievous, but the misery of the Tutsi was a 
sham or, if real, had been their own fault. 
 
                     147 Des Flores, 1999, pp.465.  
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Most information messages will fall into one or more 
of these categories with regards to psychological control 
of the population. When IO warriors review the such 
propaganda, they must insure that IO plans should be 
devised that counter these elements of propaganda.  
C.  SUMMARY 
Rwanda from an information operations perspective is a 
valuable case for future IO operators to examine and 
understand. The case itself offers valuable insight into 
the dangerous of information operations when backed by 
government policies, process, money, and technology.  
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V. CASE STUDY INTERACTION WITH IO ANNEX  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves to illustrate the potential 
utility of the proposed IO Annex information by examining 
the war in Rwanda. By using the IO Annex, it is possible to 
flush out IO themes, potential targets, and courses of 
actions (both friendly and enemy) that may be useful to IO 
planners. The IO elements described in the case study offer 
evidence that the IO Annex is an effective framework for 
multi-national counter operations in the future. 
B. EARLY WARNING 
If international organizations are to be involved in 
crises situations, they will have to overhaul their 
intelligence capabilities.148 Information Operations (IO) 
and its interactions with Information Support and 
Management allow for increased situational awareness. The 
IO actions prevalent in Rwanda fall nicely into the MPAT 
definition. For instance, MPAT focuses on IO that 
influences decision making processes of political, 
military, and social entities while protecting one’s own. 
In Rwanda, Hutu extremists lacked the ability to control 
the division of their country, thus they sought to control 
the message with-in their country. Not only was the message 
well controlled, it was propagated through simple means and 
constantly re-enforced throughout the genocide. An 
examination of the Hutus’ actions from an IO perspective 
would have made it more difficult for the genocide to be 
disguised as civil strife. 
                     148 Feil, 1998, pp. 27. 
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For the IO Annex to be effective in identifying the 
overall themes of the genocide, planners would have had to 
rely on Intelligence Support. The thoroughness of the 
intelligence, evaluation, and identification would have 
determined how rapidly appropriate response planning could 
have been prepared. There was no lack of intelligence 
reports both open and closed sources regarding the 
situation in Rwanda. As much as the Hutu extremists 
attempted to control the flow of information out of the 
country, they ultimately failed because the world has 
almost instant connectivity to events due to the media and 
the Internet.   
For successful utilization of the Annex, planners must 
rely on early warning of potential disaster. Early warning 
is the collection, analysis and communication of the 
relevant evidence and conclusions to policy-makers to 
enable them to make strategic choices. Unlike traditional 
intelligence, which also collects and analyzes information 
and communicates the results, the object of early warning 
is not primarily security for one’s self or one’s country, 
but the security of another; in early warning, the security 
is not self-directed. The other party or parties are not 
presumed to be adversaries, as is the case with 
intelligence analysis.149 The IO Annex identifies that 
intelligence support will drive the Information Operations 
and that early warning is a primary consideration. This IS 
will help define campaign objectives for IO attacks and 
counter operations.  
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C. POTENTIAL TARGETS 
IO targets for the MPAT fall into three distinct 
categories. First the Leadership target including civilian, 
social, military, and cultural targets. Second, military 
infrastructure targets include communications, 
intelligence, logistics, operations, and weapons systems. 
And finally, the civil infrastructure targets include 
telecommunications, transportation, energy, economic, and 
manufacturing. The IO ANNEX identifies the latter as the 
most likely and most critical targets that an opponent may 
target during MOOTW offensive information operations. For 
instance, in Rwanda, the lack of significant military and 
civilian infrastructure drove the leaders of the genocide 
to target the first the leadership of the opposition and 
eventually the entire civilian population of the 
opposition. They returned to only targeted killings that 
would have the most influential effects on the population. 
Using the IO Annex, planners would have identified and 
countered the targets enabling the Rwandan operations.  
The IO Annex identifies targets in offensive IO in 
three distinct categories: the global information 
infrastructure (GII), national information infrastructure 
(NII), and the defense information structure (DII). Each of 
these categories identified by the IO Annex describe one or 
more of the entities targeted during the genocide. For 
planners and operators, counter action against all three 
could have been accomplished if the IO SOP was utilized. 
For instance, threats to any force intervening in Rwanda in 
1994 could have been expected from both belligerents and 
armed civilians, lightly armed militia, combat forces of 
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the RPF, and political parties.150 Each of these groups has 
been identified in the IO Annex as potential targets of 
MPAT IO. Each group or entity make-up or influence the GII, 
NII, and/or the DII.  
D. COURSES OF ACTION 
The rapid introduction of force in Rwanda presupposes 
some definable end to be achieved and the will to achieve 
that end in a reasonable amount of time.151 A critical 
consideration in any IO campaign are the limitation of 
time, space, and force. For the Annex to be effective in 
cases, such as Rwanda, a clear understanding of these 
elements is crucial. For example, each potential course of 
action, either friendly or enemy, can easily be deduced 
using the IO Annex task selection matrix included in the 
SOP. The cell can quickly identify large strategic 
operations. Based on time restraints during operations, the 
ability of the planner to drill down to more and more 
specific IO options are also easily accomplished.  
Currently, the UN lacks the capability to respond 
rapidly in concrete ways to deteriorating situations around 
the world.152 The IO Annex is built upon the idea of the 
rapid activation of a CCTF Headquarters at the request of a 
host nation. It is not a stretch to assume that the entire 
SOP including the IO portion is useful to other 
organizations such as the United Nations or Organization of 
African States if the supporting infrastructure is put into 
place or the operation is supported by U.S. led coalition.  
                     150 Feil, 1998, pp. 7. 
151 Feil, 1998, pp. 11. 
152 Feil, 1998, pp. 12. 
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Clearly any action by the CCTF in Rwanda would fall 
distinctly into the uncertain environment of MOOTW. MOOTW 
in the uncertain environment is one in which the control, 
intent, and capability of host nation and hostile forces 
are unknown or uncertain. The type of IO required may also 
be uncertain. However, to counter IO actions in Rwanda, the 
IO Annex specifies that social interaction challenges will 
focus on civil-military operations or planned activities in 
support of military operations that enhance the 
relationship between the military forces and civilian 
authorities and population and which promote the 
development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior 
in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. IO actions would 
have focused on the social interactions of the CCTF IO Cell 
and civil-military relations with-in the Rwandan AOR. The 
IO Annex identifies this as a potential challenges during 
operations and if IO planners understand this, then their 
ability to foresee such limitations would have been greatly 
enhanced.    
E. DECONFLICTION OF IO   
Public affairs (PA) are public information, command 
information, and community relations’ activities directed 
toward both the external and internal publics. The evidence 
supports the claim that Public Affairs actions with-in 
Rwanda during the genocide would have been crucial to the 
IO actions against any group or individual because the 
control of information throughout Rwanda was the key to 
successful actions of the Hutu leadership. For example, the 
pro-Hayabarimana publication La Medaille Nyiramacibiri 
discounted reports that Hutu officials had been responsible 
for killing Tutsi and offered instead to give readers lists 
of the Hut killed by Tutsi so, “then you will know who are 
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the real criminals.”153 These types of actions are a 
combination of public affairs, psychological operations and 
military deception. The IO warrior must be aware that the 
combination of IO actions can be prevalent in numerous 
forms and may not distinctly fall into one category or 
another. This complicates IO actions because one’s action 
against psychological operations may counter one’s actions 
against public affair operations. The deconfliction issue 
is crucial to successful operations. The IO Annex provides 
an IO cell structure that provides a format for 
deconfliction of IO actions in the AOR. 
F. POSSIBLE IO AGAINST THE GENOCIDE  
Introducing force into Rwanda would have had to 
revolve around the nature and structure of multinational 
nature of peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. A 
robust communications capabilities, civil-military 
operations personnel, psychological operations staff, 
interpreters, and intelligence analysis cells would have 
been vital to the success of such a complex operation.154 To 
support such actions the IO Annex identifies the above 
cells as critical to mission accomplishment and provides a 
process for planning actions to counter the Hutu’s IO.  
Using the IO Annex Task selection tool it is clear  , 
which IO actions would have had an effect on the genocide 
in Rwanda and which actions would have been useless. First, 
any CNO actions would have failed because Rwanda itself 
offers no viable targets. In 1994, the country had limited 
computers and no Internet connections available. However, 
technical means such as EW would have been vary effective 
                     153 Des Forges, 1999.  
154 Feil, 1998, pp. 19. 
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in jamming air waves especially those used for radio 
propaganda. Second, psychological operations directed 
against both parties would have been effective to counter 
propaganda because the entire genocide revolved around 
influence operations. Third, reconnaissance and 
surveillance capabilities would be essential for forces 
engaged in mobile operations as well as for the security of 
the force.155  
G. SUMMARY 
The need for a response mechanism of other 
humanitarian catastrophes now and into the future will 
continue to drive the evolution of the IO Annex. Rwanda and 
the IO conducted prior to and during the genocide only 
serve to remind us that IO can and will continue to be a 
deadly and effective tool in future military operations. 
The overall strategy that would have been useful against 
the genocide in Rwanda would provide direction about: 1) 
the message to be passed, 2) the intended audience(s), 3) 
the unintended audience(s), 4) how to pass the message, and 
5) how to reduce the effectiveness of the opponents 
information operations.156  
More than 2,300 years ago, the ancient Chinese 
strategist Sun Tzu appreciated values, interests, and the 
rational comparison of power. Before launching a military 
campaign, he said that the temple council should compare 
unity on the home front and the morale of the army with 
that of the enemy. He was also convinced that careful 
planning based on information would contribute to speedy 
victory.157 The IO Annex could have provided the framework 
                     155 Feil, 1998, pp. 20. 
156 Morthland, 2002.  
157 Tzu, 1971. pp. 39-40.  
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for such planning in Rwanda and does offers such a 
framework for future  operations.  
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 VI. PROPOSED IO MPAT SOP ANNEX SUMMARY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The need for MPAT SOP IO Annex grew out of the 
evolution of information warfare and the increased 
requirement for coalition operations. It was created via 
inputs from senior officers of 150 nations during semi-
annual MPAT conferences. Each officer had varying levels of 
experience both in military operations and information 
operations. Some had never heard of IO, others were very 
well versed. However, all had years of experience in 
military strategic planning and implementation of a variety 
of operations.  Two goals where set for the creation and 
implementation of the Annex. First, MPAT planners wanted to 
create a usable Annex to support rapid IO planning mainly 
during Crises Action Planning (CAP) that included a 
streamlined and user-friendly IO task selection tool to 
help plan IO COA’s. Second, they wanted to create a 
document that would help commanders and operators 
understand the unique aspects of MNF IO to include the 
identification possible limitations and challenges when 
operating in the MNF environment.  
B.  THEORY 
The IO Annex revolves around the idea presented in 
Chapters I through IV and is based largely on Waltz’s 
work.158 This thesis served as an exploratory tool to create 
the Annex. As mentioned earlier in Chapter I, information 
operations extend beyond the information realm; IO also 
deals with the physical, information infrastructure, and 
perceptual realms. The interactions of the three real 
                     158 Waltz, 1998, pp. 117. 
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dealing with information content and process form the basic 
functional model of warfare.159 The physical realms are the 
physical items that may be attack as a means to influence 
information. The information infrastructure realm deals 
with the information content or process that may be 
attacked electronically to directly influence the 
information process or content without physical impact on 
the target. The perceptual realms are attacks that may be 
directly targeted on the human mind through electronic, 
printed, or oral transmission paths.  
The three realms, as described by Waltz, support the 
first goal of the MPAT because they offer the framework 
required to tailor the MNF IO Annex. The first goal was to 
support Crises Action Planning. The IO Annex has 
accomplished this goal by creating: 
(1) A straightforward user-friendly design Annex.  
 
(2) IO definitions suitable for MNF operations. 
 
(3) Simple IO Cell design including numerous non-IO 
members involved in IO planning (such Intel, PAO, 
and Legal). 
 
(4) Supplemented Host Nation IO planning and strategic 
guidance. 
 
(5) Including all IO definitions and elements. 
 
(6) Including IO Cell structure and responsibilities 
 
(7) Including Risk/Benefit/Cost calculations matrixes. 
 
(8) Including additional planning guidance, limitation 
and challenges of IO. 
 
The second goal was to create a document that would 
help commanders and operators understand the unique aspects                      159 Waltz, 1998, pp. 27. 
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of MNF IO and create a user-friendly IO task selection tool 
to help plan IO COA’s. This goal was accomplished by 
including in the IO Annex the following: 
 
(1) Input into overall MNF COA development. 
 
(2) Calculations of the probabilities associated with 
COA and ECOA. 
 
(3) Additional guidance for COA development.  
 
(4) Additional information on possible IO actions, 
limitations and challenges of each COA or ECOA. 
 
(5) Questions to aid commanders in the decision cycle. 
 
(6) A mechanism to assist operators and planners cover 
all the unique aspects of IO in one documents. 
 
(7) Non-trained IO planners and operators the ability to 
understand the basics of IO. 
 
(8) Limitations and challenges for IO selection. 
 
C.  PROPOSED SOP IO ANNEX 
The proposed SOP utilizes the created MPAT generated 
IO definition presented in chapter I. “IO are actions taken 
to effect information, information systems, and influence 
decision making processes of political, military, and 
social entities while protecting one’s own. IO spans the 
entire spectrum from peace, to crisis, to conflict, to 
restoration”. The definition highlights the idea that 
offensive and defensive IO goes beyond technology and 
focuses of political, military, and social entities of the 
decision cycle. These entities and actions against them are 
driven by unity of purpose, effort, and interoperability. 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the annex is to provide a description 
of the CCTF Information Operations Working Group (IOWG), 
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its responsibilities, and procedures for conducting 
successful IO.  The annex specifies methods for the 
establishment an IOWG.  All efforts executed by the 
Coalition/Combined Task Force (CCTF) IOWG must be 
coordinated within the CCTF and with the Supported 
Strategic Commander’s overarching IO policies and guidance. 
The CCTF IOWG is organized to ensure that a broad range of 
IO actions and activities are integrated into the CCTF 
planning process, coordinated with ongoing or planned 
operations, and contribute to the CCTF’s intent and desired 
end states. 
2.  Responsibilities  
The CCTF C3 is the principle staff element responsible 
for embedding IO into the Coalition/Combined Planning Group 
(CPG) process and ensuring that IO is properly integrated 
and coordinated throughout all operational phases. The CCTF 
IOWG is composed of select representatives from the staff 
and from supporting agencies/organizations and is 
responsible to the CCTF C3 for planning, integration, 
coordination, monitoring, and assessment of the Information 
Environment (IE) within the AO. Coordination of operational 
and strategic IO objectives with the Supported Strategic 
Commander’s IOWG is essential. The CCTF C3 must integrate 
IO target concerns and target nominations into the planning 
and execution cycle of the targeting process. Other 
responsibilities and duties of the IOWG include: 
(1) Incorporate Lead Nation’s National Command 
Authorities guidance and the Multinational Force 
Strategy for the MNF partners into IO objectives in 
support of strategic goals.  
 
(2) Coordinate with the media and public relations 
office for the Lead Nation National Command 
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Authorities and the Supported Strategic Commander 
(for example CCTF Public Affairs Office). 
 
(3) Coordinate IO related guidance for: 
a. Physical Destruction  
b. Electronic Warfare (EW)  
c. Computer Network Operations (CNO): for example 
Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer 
d. Network Defense (CND), and Cyber Warfare 
e. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)  
f. Operations Security (OPSEC) and Military 
Deception (MILDEC)  
g. Public Affairs (PA) 
h. Other capabilities and functions. 
 
(4) Coordinates with all staff elements to shape the 
impact of CCTF actions on the adversary’s perception 
and ability to operate. 
 
(5) Draw upon the capabilities of other coalition 
military organizations, government, and non-
government agencies as necessary to obtain 
information for planning and operational 
considerations.  
 
(6) Provide a representative to the C5 Future Plans and 
FOPS to advise on the development of IO related 
guidance for the CCTF. 
 
3. Process 
Employment of IO begins with articulating and 
understanding the CCTF’s mission, concept of operations, 
objectives, and intent.  The same fundamentals of campaign 
planning apply to the IO portion of the plan.  
Specifically, the working group will provide detailed 
concepts of IO operations for supporting CCTF objectives.  
The operational level links the tactical employment of IO 
to strategic objectives. Furthermore, the IOWG will 
coordinate, integrate, analyze, and develop the IO plan. 
The IOWG will coordinate and integrate the CCTF IO Campaign 
Plan into the CCTF OPORD or Campaign Plan. Additionally, 
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the IOWG will conduct extensive mission analysis of IO 
operations within the spectrum of MOOTW and SSC. The IOWG 
will also develop IO objectives based on guidance from the 
CCTF. Finally, the IO Cell will review and determine the 
targets, areas of influence, or audiences that are to be 
the focus of IO actions.  
CCTF IO Actions







• Conduct initial mission assessment
• Input to initial recon and surveillance 
• Prepare initial IO estimate
• Determine essential IO tasks from higher HQ
or new mission
• Identify specified, implied and essential tasks
• Analyze IO impact on capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 
combat power.
• Develop IO concept of support for each COA
• Refine IO objectives for each COA
• Develop initial tasks to achieve IO objectives
• Develop COA evaluation criteria.
• Analyze advantages and disadvantages of IO concept of 
support for each COA
• Provide IO input to COA recommendation.
• Input IO concept of support and objectives
• Prepare IO execution matrix
• Finalize IO annex  
Figure 10. CCTF IO ACTIONS 
 
4.  CCTFG IOWG Procedures  
The Annex directs the development of IO operations and 
the associated delivery methods needed to achieve defined 
objectives against specified targets IO in the CCTF can be 
accomplished by Influence and/or Electronic approaches. For 
offensive IO and precision engagement, the CCTF IOWG 
requires intelligence to support planning and control of 
operations for offensive IO to include efforts to shape and 
influence perceptions, computer network attack or other 
courses of action taken against adversaries.  The CCTF IOWG 
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must define campaign objectives for IO attacks, and 
monitor, coordinate, and integrate component activities to 
identify targets and target access, assess the target’s 
vulnerabilities, select the optimum IO attack and provide 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA).  For defensive IO and full dimensional 
protection, the CCTF IOWG needs to know adversary IO attack 
capabilities (if any) to facilitate defensive and 
information assurance programs.  It is imperative that the 
CCTF IOWG submits intelligence requirements as early as 
possible after CCTF establishment. The following procedures 
are incorporated and should be utilized by the MNF: 
(1) SITUATION 
a. Enemy. Identify enemy IO C2 nodes and the 
vulnerability of those nodes 
i. Terrain. List terrain aspect as affecting 
each of the IO elements. 
ii. Weather. List weather aspects as affecting 
each of the IO elements. 
iii. Enemy IO capabilities 
iv. Identify enemy IO elements. 
v. Identify enemy C2 vulnerabilities. 
vi. Identify enemy capabilities to degrade 
friendly C2. 
vii. Identify the enemy situation, force 
disposition, intelligence elements, and 
possible actions. 
viii. Identify specific information that bears 
directly on the planned IO. 
 
b. Friendly. Identify IO elements and their 
vulnerability to enemy actions. 
i. Identify IO capabilities to degrade enemy 
C2. 
ii. Identify IO assets needed to attack enemy 
targets. 
iii. Identify the friendly forces that will 
directly affect information superiority. 




c. Attachments and detachments. 
i. List IO assets that are attached or 
detached. 
ii. List IO resources available from higher 
headquarters. 
 




a. Scheme of support.  
i. Describe the IO concept of support, IO 
objective, and tasks to the IO elements. 
Complex IO concept of support may require a 
schematic to show IO objectives and IO task 
relationships.  
ii. Include a discussion of the overall IO 
concept of support, with the specific 
details in either subparagraphs or 
appendixes. 
b. Execution Matrix. Refer to execution matrix to 
clarify the timing relationship among various IO 
tasks. This annex should contain the information 
to synchronize timing relationship of each of the 
elements IO and the related IO activities of PA 
and CA. 
c. Operations Security (OPSEC). State how the OPSEC 
objectives and OPSEC tasks will deny the enemy 
information based on the approved COA. Emphasis 
is on denying the enemy accesses to his own or 
foreign intelligence elements. Identify target 
sets and desired effect, by priority, for OPSEC. 
Synchronize this element with the other IO 
elements. 
d. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). State how the 
PSYOP objectives and PSYOP tasks will degrade, 
disrupt deny, or influence the enemy based on the 
approved COA. Identify the audiences, and desired 
effect, by priority, for PSYOP. Synchronize this 
element with the other IO elements.  
e. Military deception (MILDEC). State how the 
military deception objectives and military 
deception tasks will deceive, and influence the 
enemy based on the approved COA. Synchronize this 
element with the other IO elements.  
f. Electronic Warfare (EW). State how the EW 
objectives and EW tasks will degrade, disrupt, 
115 
deny, and deceive the enemy based on the approved 
COA. State the defensive and offensive EW 
measures. Identify target sets and effect, by 
priority, for EW operations. Synchronize this 
element with the other IO elements.  
g. Information Assurance (IA). State how the IA 
objectives and IA tasks will deny the enemy 
access to our C4 based on the approved COA. 
Identify the information and INFOSYS for 
protection. Synchronize this element with the 
other IO elements. 
h. Counterdeception. State how the counterdeception 
objectives and counterdeception tasks will 
disrupt, deny and exploit the enemy based on the 
approved COA. Identify the units for protection. 
Synchronize this element with the other IO 
elements. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence, for 
detailed counterdeception information. 
i. Counterintelligence. State how the 
counterintelligence objectives and 
counterintelligence tasks will degrade, disrupt, 
deny and exploit the enemy based on the approved 
COA. Identify the units for protection. 
Synchronize this element with the other IO 
elements. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence, for 
detailed counterintelligence information. 
j. Counter propaganda. State how the counter 
propaganda objectives and counter propaganda 
tasks will degrade, disrupt, deny and exploit the 
enemy based on the approved COA. Identify the 
units for protection. Synchronize this element 
with the other IO elements.  
k. Physical destruction. State how the physical 
destruction objectives and physical destruction 
tasks will destroy, degrade, disrupt, and deny 
the enemy based on the approved COA. Identify 
target sets and effect, by priority, for 
destruction. Synchronize this element with the 
other IO elements. 
l. Computer network attack (CNO). State how the CNO 
objectives and CNO tasks will destroy, degrade, 
disrupt, and deny the enemy based on the approved 
COA. Identify target sets and effect, by 
priority, for attack. Synchronize this element 
with the other IO elements.  
m. Physical Security. State how the physical 
security objectives and physical security tasks 
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will deny the enemy based on the approved COA. 
Synchronize this element with the other IO 
elements. 
n. Special Information Operations. SIO may be 
classified. Access is restricted to strict need 
to know. Synchronize this element with the other 
IO elements. 
o. Civil Affairs (CA). CA is a related activity to 
IO. State the IO objectives for CA. 
p. Public Affairs (PA). PA is a related activity to 
IO. State the IO objectives for PA. 
 
5.  Additional Considerations  
Conducting Combined/Coalition Information Operations 
can present classification challenges that must be 
addressed during combined planning.  Use of the Coalition 
Coordination Center (CCC) can greatly assist in this 
process. The specific manning requirements and number of 
augmenters to the CCTF IOWG should be tailored to meet 
mission requirements identified in Crisis Action Planning. 
Upon standing up the CCTF, identify early on communications 
connectivity requirements for support to the CCTF IOWG. It 
is imperative that IO initiatives are coordinated and 
approved as early as possible when the CCTF is activated.  
Various IO products, such as CNA and PSYOPS, require 
approval at the Lead Nation, supporting nations and/or at 
strategic levels.  
D.  INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURES 
The simple straightforward approach to IO presented 
above focuses on technology, procedures, and policy. In 
order to be successful, all three of these elements must in 
balance within the CCTF. As important as hardware may be, 
innovative doctrine, tactics, training, and organizations 
must be developed and refined in a process of transforming 
military operations for the information age.160 Not all 
                     160 Gompert, Kugler, & Libicki, 1999, pp. 3.  
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problems that will be faced by the MNF will find solutions 
in technology. Furthermore, the level of technology may not 
be the most important factor.161 Procedures and policies may 
also be the limiting factor when dealing with IO. For 
instance, each the host nation is limited by bandwidth 
internal to the CCTF, a technological fix may not be 
possible. Planners must turn to policy and procedures to 
find work-around to the problem.  
E.  SUMMARY 
New technology alone does not revolutionize warfare. 
Rather, technology's impact on systems evolution, 
operational tactics, and organizational structure is its 
true advantage.162 This fuels necessary and complementary 
changes in doctrine and organizational structure. It may be 
a simple as limiting the amount of data passed on the 
lines, limiting users to specific times, or outsourcing 
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A.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explained the rational associated with the 
creation of a useable MNF MPAT IO Annex for use during 
MOOTW and SCC. In order to be more useful in the future, a 
summary of findings, the limitations of this study is, and 
a section dedicated to follow-on research is included to 
stimulate continued research and discussion in support of 
mutli-national IO.   
B.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The findings of the research indicate four main 
points. First, IO in the MNF relies heavily on U.S. centric 
approach to operations. This is due to the large doctrinal 
and technology gaps between member nations. Second, most 
foreign members of the MPAT see IO as a technological 
weapon and if they do not possess the technology they 
believe they cannot participate in operations. Third, IO 
must have the ability to utilize the physical destruction 
of the target to accomplish operational goals. Physical 
destruction can remain in the traditional war fighter 
realm; however IO operators must understand that it is a 
viable option or hindrance. Finally, the concepts of 
precision engagement and full dimensional protection apply 
to IO.  
C.  PREDICTIONS 
For future operations in the MPAT or any MNF 
environment, IO will continue to evolve as a distinct and 
separate form of warfare. First, IO will become a larger 
and more integrated part of MNF operations. Second, more 
MNF member nations will turn to the unique elements of IO 
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to meet operational objective. Third, MNF members will 
attempt to close the U.S. lead associated with technologies 
dealing with information operations. Finally, CNO will play 
and ever increasing role and may eventually dominates IO 
actions as the use of technology in member nations 
increase. 
D.  VALIDATION/LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The actual use of the IO Annex has never been proven 
in real world or exercise operations. However, the U.S. 
Pacific Command has adopted portions of the IO Annex 
created during MPAT conferences. Many of the military and 
IO principles, challenges, and limitations have been proven 
over time. Furthermore, the case study does offer a 
validation of the procedures presented. The goal was to 
advance the study Information Operations and provide the 
bases for a document that could be used during 
multinational operations. The key principles of precision 
engagement and dimension defense are not new, however there 
are almost no studies regarding these principles with the 
application of IO. If a solid baseline for the IO Annex of 
the MPAT SOP was created during the study, the author has 
succeeded.  
E.  PROPOSED FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
To improve upon this work, future reviews and research 
is required in several different areas. First, continues 
review of the SOP by MPAT members during scheduled 
conferences is required. The IO Annex included in this 
research is not static. The entire field of IO and its 
relation to operations is an evolving field of study. The 
annex created should serve as a starting point for future 
reviews and operations; it is not intended to be a dynamic 
fixture for IO planners and operators.  
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Second, lesson lessons learned from actual operations 
and follow-on conferences should be incorporated into 
future reviews and new editions of the IO Annex. Only 
useful inputs from actual real world operations will serve 
to further the usefulness of the IO Annex.  
Finally, an in-depth study on the technical 
limitations of MPAT member nations is required to further 
the creation of the annex. Additional studies in the 
technical limitations offers planners the ability to focus 
on what technological are available for operations in the 
MPAT organization and may avoid delays in assembly 
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APPENDIX A: INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY  
The below included appendices were created via the 
inputs of numerous officers from a host of Asian-Pacific 
countries led by the U.S. Pacific Command’s MPAT 
organization. Annex D is the accumulation of MPAT inputs 
from 2003-2004. The author, to further the operational 
readiness and completeness of the SOP, created the 








































































































































































































































APPENDIX B: KEY TERMS 
1.  Coalition/ Combined Task Force (CCTF): A military force 
composed of elements of two or more allied nations. (DoD) 
 
2. Cooperative IO (CIO): When a cadre of military planners 
from different nations comes together to plan and execute 
IO during and MNF exercise or real world operation. 
 
3. Information Environment (IE): Is the aggregate of 
individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, 
process, or disseminate information; also included is the 
information itself. (FM 3-13) 
 
4. Information Management (IM): Is all activities involved 
in the collection, filtering, fusing, processing, 
dissemination and use of information for CCTF operations. 
Information that promotes understanding of the battle 
space enables commanders to better formulate and analyze 
courses of action, make decisions, execute those 
decisions with adjustments to the plan as necessary, and 
accurately assess the operation. 
 
5. Information Operations (IO): Are actions taken to affect 
adversary and influence others’ decision-making 
processes, information, and information systems, while 
protecting one’s own information and information systems. 
(FM 3-0) 
 
6. Information Superiority: The capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information whiles exploiting or denying an adversary’s 
ability to do the same. (JP1-02) 
 
7. Multi National Information Operations (MNFIO): Are 
actions taken to effect information, information systems, 
and influence decision making processes of political, 
military, and social entities while protecting one’s own. 
IO spans the entire spectrum from peace, to crisis, to 
conflict, to restoration. 
 
8. Military Operations other Than War (MOOTW): Operations 
that encompass the use of military capabilities across 
the range of military operations short of war. These 
military actions can be applied to complement any 
combination of the other instruments of national power 
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and occur before, during, and after war. MOOTW focus on 
deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses 
large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve 
national objectives or to protect national interests. (JP 
3-07)  
 
9. Multi National Operations (MNF): A collective term to 
describe military actions conducted by forces of two or 
more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of 
a coalition or alliance. (DoD) 
 
10. Multi Planning and Augmentation Team (MPAT): A cadre 
of military planners with interests in the Asia-Pacific 
region capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational 
force headquarters established to plan and executes 
coalition operations in response to small-scale 
contingencies. 
 
11. Small Scale Contingencies (SCC): A military operation 
that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as 
a contingency operation or becomes a contingency 
operation as a matter of law (10 United States code (USC) 
101[a][13]). It is a military operation that: a. is 
designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in 
which members of the Armed Forces are or may become 
involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities 
against an enemy of the United States or against an 
opposing force; or b. is created by definition of law. 
Under 10 USC 101 (a)(13)(B), a contingency operation 
exists if a military operation results in the (1) call up 
to (or retention on) active duty of members of the 
uniformed Services under certain enumerated statutes (10 
USC Sections 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, 
or 331-335); and (2) the call up to (or retention on) 
active duty of members of the uniformed Services under 
other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national 
emergency declared by the President or Congress. (DoD) 
 
12. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP): A set of 
instructions covering those features of operations, which 
lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure 
without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is 
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